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Appleton: Parents by the Numbers

PARENTS BY THE NUMBERS
Susan FrelichAppleton*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Family law, as part of the larger prevailing culture, has enshrined
the number two. By constructing links among sex, marriage, and
procreation and conceptualizing each as a practice for two, family law
takes as its paradigm the couple or the pair.' Departures from the twoparty model attract attention-triggering legal sanctions, inspiring
scholarly debate, or simply capturing the collective imagination. Recent
months have offered one case in point, as courts and a fascinated public
followed the raid on the Yearning for Zion compound in Texas and the

*

Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University School of

Law. This Article is an expanded version of the Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished
Professorship Lecture that I gave at Hofstra University School of Law on April 23, 2008. I
discussed an earlier version at the 30th Congress of the International Academy of Law and Mental
Health in Padua, Italy, on June 25, 2007. For the stimulating exchange of views, I thank the other
members of the panel there on "Children in the Post-Nuclear Family," Laura Kessler, Annette
Appell, Laura Rosenbury, Donna Young, and Irene Cant, and for the travel and research support, I
thank Dean Kent Syverud. For helpful comments on prior drafts, I thank Katharine Bartlett, Cheryl
Block, Adrienne Davis, Rebecca Dresser, Laura Rosenbury, and workshop participants at
Washington University's Faculty Research Seminar. For clarifications of their positions, I thank
Katharine Baker, Melanie Jacobs, and Laura Kessler. Finally, I am grateful to John DeWitt Gregory,
Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, and all the others at Hofstra who
made my visit so rewarding.
1. Even legal regimes designed to depart from the traditional marital model still focus on
couples of one type or another. Thus, civil unions and domestic partnerships, no less than same-sex
marriage, envision a two-party sexual relationship. See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384 (Cal. 2008) (holding unconstitutional a California statute limiting designation of marriage to
different-sex couples). And, Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries law, which does not assume a
conjugal relationship, still applies only to "couples composed of two individuals who are legally
prohibited from marrying under state law." HAw. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2006). As a result,
relationships that include more than two challenge the conventional construction of family law. See,
e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REv 189 (2007) (exploring how
family law has ignored relationships among friends).
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polygamous residents' challenge to the familiar spousal dyad.2 The
ongoing conversation about departures from the optimal parental number
almost invariably includes criticism of single parents 3 and typically
encompasses a wide range of topics, from welfare reform, 4 to marriagepromotion programs, 5 to the legal status of sperm donors who enable
women to become single mothers by choice.6
Last year, however, a much more unusual numbers issue, whether
particular children can or should have more than two parents, surfaced
with seeming suddenness-even if some precursors and closely related
developments had been percolating beforehand.7 In 2007, two North
2. See, e.g., In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex.
2008) (holding the State's emergency seizure of 468 children from the Yearning for Zion Ranch
unwarranted, despite allegations of "spiritual unions" involving underage females); Kirk Johnson &
John Dougherty, Raidon Sect in Texas Rattles PolygamistFaithful Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2008, at Al. See generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
PolyamorousExistence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (2004) (examining "the fantasy of
monogamy" and contemporary polyamorous alternatives).
3. See, e.g., Institute for American Values et al., MarriageBreakdown Costs Taxpayers at
Least $112 Billion a Year: First-Time Research Reveals Staggering Annual Taxpayer Costs for
Divorce and Unwed Childbearing, Apr. 15, 2008 (press release), available at
http://www.americanvalues.org/coff/pressrelease.pdf.
4. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 222-25 (1997); Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of
Reform, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2012 (1994) (critiquing stereotypes permeating the calls for welfare
reform).
5. See, e.g., Healthy Marriage Initiative, 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2) (effective July 15, 2008); see
also, e.g., Julie Nice, Promoting MarriageExperimentation: A Class Act?, 24 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 31, 35 (2007); Nancy Cambria, Fighting Poverty With an "I Do", ST. LOUIS POST-

DISPATCH, Dec. 19, 2007, at Al; Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, THE
ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 47, 71.

6. Compare Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An InterpretativeApproach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 903-12 (2000) (arguing for
recognition of sperms donors as legal fathers, when single women use artificial insemination), with
In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007) (applying statute to deny recognition as a legal father to a
sperm donor, in the absence of written agreement), cert. denied sub nom. Hendrix v. Harrington,
129 S.Ct. 36 (2008), and Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007) (upholding an oral
agreement between the mother and the sperm donor that he would have no responsibility as a
parent). See generally Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19,
2006, at 44 (detailing the experiences of several single women who used donor insemination to have
children).
7. For an occasional previous examination of the issue, see, for example, R. Alta Charo, And
Baby Makes Three-orFour, or Five, or Six: Redefining the Family After the Reprotech Revolution,
15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 231 (2000) and Pamela Gatos, Note, Third-ParentAdoption in Lesbian and
Gay Families,26 VT. L. REv. 195 (2001); see also COMM'N ON PARENTHOOD'S FUTURE, INSTITUTE
FOR AMERICAN VALUES, THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH
BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN'S NEEDS 10-15 (2006) [hereinafter THE REVOLUTION IN

PARENTHOOD] (a survey of relevant developments in the United States and abroad, led by principal
investigator Elizabeth Marquardt); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? DisaggregatingTraditional

ParentalRights and Responsibilitiesto Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 327-
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American courts, one in Ontario8 and one in Pennsylvania, 9 ruled that a
child can have three legal parents: a biological mother, her same-sex
partner, and the sperm donor or genetic father. Contemporaneously,
three scholars-Professors Laura Kessler, Katharine Baker, and Melanie
Jacobs--each were writing largely supportive examinations of a concept
called, respectively,
"community
parenting,"10 "less
binary
1
parenthood,"" and "multiple parenthood."' 12 Others, including Professor
Nancy Dowd, were focusing more specifically on the possibility of
multiple fathers. 13 Thus, these cases and scholars endorse the recognition
of parents by the numbers-in the sense of accepting the possibility that
a child might have numerous parents. (I shall call the position they
advance "multi-parentage" and these scholars its "supporters," although
their positions vary, ranging from mere openness14 to enthusiastic
advocacy.15)
Meanwhile, The Revolution in Parenthood, a report issued by6
several organizations dedicated to preserving traditional family values,1
32 (2007) (discussing earlier developments that might be considered precursors). Cf JAMES G.
DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 285 (2006) (noting that the author's proposed
parentage statute might allow "for addition of a third legal parent.").
8. A.A. v. B.B., [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 522, 533-34 (Can.), leave to appeal denied
sub. noma.Alliance for Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
9. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 2007 PA Super. 118, l24-25, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2007).
10. See Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting,24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47,49 (2007).
11. Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Constructionof Parenthood,42 GA. L. REV.
649, 655 (2008).
12. Jacobs, supra note 9, at 313; see also Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating
Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 851-52 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two
Dads].
13. Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007)
[hereinafter Dowd, Multiple Parents];Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathersand Social
Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 909 (2006); Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 12.
For additional examinations of the issue more generally, see Laura Nicole Althouse, Three's
Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed
Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 171 (2008) and Brian Bix, The Bogeyman of Three (or
More) Parents (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-22, Aug. 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1196562.
14. E.g., Baker, supra note 11. Perhaps calling Baker a "supporter" overstates her position. In
fact, her thorough analysis seeks to examine, without prejudging the outcome, what role we want
biology or a system modeled on biology to play in our parentage regime. See id. at 653-56. In the
course of this analysis, she interrogates the traditional two-parent model. Given her openness to
departures from the traditional model, I place Baker-on the continuum of participants in the
relevant discourse-closer to the supporters of multi-parentage than to the opponents, as described
infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
15. E.g., Kessler, supra note 10, at 72-74.
16. TIr REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 1. This report, which lists Elizabeth
Marquardt, the Vice President of the Institute for American Values, as the principal investigator,
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along with a New York Times op-ed piece by the report's author,
Elizabeth Marquardt, condemned these new developments as
unprecedented and wrong-headed departures from what she dubs "the
rule of two.' 17 These authorities assert that family law should determine
parents by the numbers-in the sense of making a numerical limit, two,
dispositive in all cases. (I shall talk about this position as "biparentage"' 8 and refer collectively to its organizational and individual
adherents as "opponents of multi-parentage.")
Significantly, all of the contributions to the discourse invoke the
interests of children in their analyses.' 9
Some contemporary debates-such as those about same-sex
marriage and abortion-have become so consuming and so inseparable
from a clearly identified side in the culture wars 20 that they have left
little space for fresh analysis or insight. Despite the recent spurts of
attention devoted to the question whether a child may have more than
two legal parents, 2' however, this conversation has proceeded with less
fanfare and in a more subdued register than those high-profile
controversies. Precisely because the notion of multi-parentage remains

bears the names of the Institute for American Values; the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy;
the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law, and Culture; and the Institute of Marriage and Family
Canada. Id.
17. Elizabeth Marquardt, Op-Ed, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at
A13 [hereinafter Marquardt, When 3 Really Is a Crowd] ("[N]o court should break open the rule of
two when assigning legal parenthood."). This op-ed piece subsequently appeared in several other
newspapers, albeit under varying titles. See Elizabeth Marquardt, Op-Ed, When Three Really Is a
Crowd: Mommy + Mommy + Donor, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 19, 2007, at 7; Elizabeth
Marquardt, If Two Parents Are Good for Children, Aren't Three Better?, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July 18, 2007, at B7; see also, e.g., Editorial, Family Matters, WASH. TIMES, July

17, 2007, at A18 (calling for reinforcement of "the two-parent, nuclear family"); Susan Reimer,
Roundup of News Items Worthy of Comment, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 7, 2007, at Cl. In addition, the
New York Times published six letters to the editor in response to Marquardt's op-ed piece, including
two from law professors. Letters to the Editor, The Complex ParentingNetwork, N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 2007, at A18 (including letters from Professors Melanie B. Jacobs and Richard F. Storrow).
18. Baker's work uses the term "bi-parenting." Baker, supra note 11, at 673; Katharine K.
Baker, Bargaining or Biology?: The History and Future of PaternityLaw and ParentalStatus, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 16 (2004) [hereinafter Baker, Bargainingor Biology?].
19. See infra notes 321-29 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing
majority of "tak[ing] sides in the culture war").
21. This Article does not attempt to support the premise that family law has long followed, if
not a "rule of two," then at least a two-parent norm. The scholarship examined here covers this
territory quite thoroughly. For a few examples of case law articulating this norm, see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("California law, like nature
itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.") and Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8
(Cal. 1993) (declining to recognize as a parent, along with the genetic and intended mother and
father, the gestational surrogate).
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both less familiar and less charged, the normative implications are still
emerging.
Beyond normative implications, an examination of the recent
discourse on multi-parentage-including the omissions from this
discourse-yields several important observations about family law
today. In particular, this discourse provides a lens that reveals not only
family law's current practices and trajectory but also unfinished
business, unspoken assumptions, and problematic inconsistencies. Using
the recent discourse on multi-parentage as a point of departure, this
Article identifies several issues that family law must address to provide a
coherent and credible frame for recent reforms. Along the way, while
largely allying myself with the supporters of multi-parentage, I include
some significant points and elaborations missing from their treatment of
the topic.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II introduces the recent
discourse about parental numbers, including highlights of the competing
normative positions and the two cases that brought multi-parentage to
life in 2007. This Part then situates these cases within developments in
the laws governing custody and child support for traditional bi-parent
families that have paved the way for the nontraditional outcomes in
these cases, specifically the rise of functional tests for parentage and the
"deconstruction" of parental status. This analysis shows how family law
is already equipped to recognize multi-parentage. In so doing, this Part
rejects the both supporters' and opponents' characterizations of legally
recognized multi-parentage as revolutionary and also difficult to
operationalize, absent significant changes in family law.
Part III uses multi-parentage to illuminate the work still to be done
on several issues that family law has begun to address, including the
criteria for functional parenthood and the governing jurisdictional
standards. As this Part points out, there has been an ongoing need for
additional development of the law on these issues even in bi-parentage
cases. The possibility of multi-parentage, however, makes more salient
the uncertainties, shortcomings, and unarticulated assumptions that
remain unaddressed. Addressing these problems, in turn, might well
eliminate several of the reasons that seem to make multi-parentage
troubling.
Part IV engages more theoretically with the recent discourse,
considering the role of multi-parentage in identifying, achieving, and
contesting some of family law's aspirations, such as the "deconstruct[ion
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of] traditional gender and sexuality norms., 22 In fact, however, existing
evidence complicates the picture, by suggesting that expanded parental
numbers might reinforce traditional norms and hierarchies instead of
challenging them. This Part also explores how enlarging the
conventional number of parents not only changes the legal status of
some individuals previously considered outsiders or third parties, but
also prompts rethinking parental status itself.
Part V concludes, using the discourse on multi-parentage to
consider the priority that family law professes to give to children's
interests and to emphasize a few of the persisting difficulties of this
approach.
II.

SITUATING MULTI-PARENTAGE IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW

A. Introducingthe Discourse
In making the case for multi-parentage, the supporters typically
begin by acknowledging modem family law's reliance on both biology
and non-biological connections in determining parentage.23 Traditional
principles identified a child's mother by birth and the father primarily on
the basis of a man's marriage to the mother, 4 with adoption providing
an alternative formal route to a legally recognized parent-child
relationship. More recently, sophisticated genetic testing, use of donated
gametes and gestational surrogates in assisted reproduction, and new
applications of traditional formal rules-such as second-parent
adoptions 25 and a presumption of legitimacy for some same-sex
couples 2 6-have multiplied the biological and formal connections 27 that
adults and children might share. Similarly, all those scholars considering
multi-parentage emphasize modern family law's functional turn 28-the
rise of standards that accord legal recognition to those who perform a

22.
23.

Kessler, supra note 10, at 50.
See Baker, supra note 11, at 651-53; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 309-10, 318; Kessler, supra

note 10, at 47-48.
24. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 233-34 (2006).
25. E.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).

26. See generally Appleton, supra note 24 (examining application of traditional parentage
presumptions for same-sex couples).
27. By "formal connections," I mean those resulting from compliance with legal formalities,
such as marriage or adoption.
28.

See Baker, supra note 11, 679-99; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 333-35; Kessler, supra note 10,

at 63-65.
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family relationship, regardless of the absence of formal or biological
connections.29 Such functional tests have permitted the law sometimes to
recognize parental status based on behavior and the resulting emotional
ties and dependencies. 30 Of course, such criteria do not compel any
particular numerical limits on parents for a given child.
The recent cases from Pennsylvania and Ontario provide useful
illustrations of these observations at work. The Pennsylvania case, Jacob
v. Shultz-Jacob,31 relied on a melange of biological, formal, and
functional elements after the breakdown of a couple's relationship to
reject the argument that only two adults could be accorded parental
status.32 In this case, two women, Jodilynn Jacob and Jennifer ShultzJacob, having celebrated a commitment ceremony and a Vermont civil
union, had been rearing four children while living together. Two of the
children were Jacob's nephews, whom she had adopted; the other two,
her biological children, had been conceived with the assistance of friend,
Carl Frampton, who served as semen donor but who also remained
involved in the children's lives. The parties' had stipulated ShultzJacob's status as "in loco parentis" which, the court explained, affords
her standing but does not make her equal to a "natural parent," who has
a prima facie right to custody.33 Using this weighted evidentiary scale,
the court approved the lower court's decision that Shultz-Jacob would
get partial physical custody and shared legal custody of three of the four
children, that Jacob would get primary physical custody and shared legal
custody of the same three children, and that Frampton would receive
partial physical custody of his two biological children. Turning to the
question of child support and rejecting the trial court's "view that the
interjection of a third person in the traditional support scenario would
29. For example, in some jurisdictions, a couple performing as married, regardless of gender,
will be accorded some of the rights and benefits of formally married couples. E.g., Braschi v. Stahl
Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54-55 (N.Y. 1989) (reading "family" broadly to recognize for deceased
tenant's partner some rights of survivorship under rent control law); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d
735, 737-38 (Wash. 2001) (permitting recognition of some equitable claims of entitlement to
community property by surviving partner); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.01-.06 (2002) (specifying consequences of

family dissolution for domestic partners). For an examination of such phenomena in an earlier era,
see Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History ofActing Married,100 COLUM. L. REV. 957
(2000).
30. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a biological
mother's conduct estopped her from denying a prior agreement with her same-sex partner); In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005) (recognizing de facto parents). For other

authorities on this point, see Kessler, supra note 10, at 64-65 n. 105.
31. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 2007 PA Super. 118, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
32.
33.

Id. "1 2-5, 10, 14, 24-25, 923 A.2d at 476-77, 482.
Id. 10, 923 A.2d at 477.
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create an untenable situation," 34 the court vacated the decision below and
remanded, reasoning that equitable estoppel could justify Shultz-Jacob's
support obligation while biology and active rearing activities could
justify Frampton's. 35 In the meantime, the court's unquestioned
assumption of Jacob's parental status 36 elided the genetic, gestational,
adoptive, and rearing connections that might have been invoked in favor
of her recognition.
Just a few months before, in A.A. v. B.B., a court in Ontario relied
on its parens partriae authority to recognize three parents for a fiveyear-old boy, filling an inadvertent legislative gap. 3 7 In this case, the
biological mother's partner sought a declaration of maternity while their
relationship remained intact. The couple had not pursued recognition via
adoption because doing so, they reasoned, would sever the parental ties
between the child and the male friend who assisted them in conceiving
and whose involvement in the child's life (as "father") all three adults
regarded as beneficial.38 Notably, in this case, the ruling applied to an
ongoing family relationship, while in the Pennsylvania case the court
was dividing rights and obligations at dissolution.
These cases, although unusual in their recognition of more than two
parents, rely on concepts similar to those detailed in the American Law
34. Id. 24-25, 923 A.2d at 482. The superior court examined two precedents invoked by
the trial court, L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 2002 PA Super, 390, 17, 813 A.2d 872, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(using equitable estoppel to hold a mother's former partner liable for child support) and Ferguson v.
McKiernan,2004 PA Super 289,
6, 8, 855 A.2d 121, 123-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding that a
single mother and semen donor cannot "bargain[] away a legal right not held by either of
them... but belonging to the subject children" and thus rejecting an agreement that the donor
would have no responsibilities). Jacob, 2007 PA Super.
20-24, 932 A.2d at 480-82. As the
opinion in Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob notes, the state supreme court granted review in Ferguson.Jacob,
2007 PA Super. 22 n.8, 923 A.2d at 481 n.8. Subsequently, the supreme court reversed Ferguson,
holding enforceable a contract to relieve the donor of financial responsibilities. Ferguson v.
McKieman, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007). The Ferguson majority reasoned that a rule of
unenforceability
would mean that a woman who wishes to have a baby but is unable to conceive through
intercourse could not seek sperm from a man she knows and admires, while assuring him
that he will never be subject to a support order and being herself assured that he will
never be able to seek custody of the child[]
-and thus she would have no choice but to resort to anonymously donated semen. Id. at 1247.
35. Jacob, 2007 PA Super. IM23-25, 923 A.2d at 481-82. Frampton died while the case was
pending. Reggie Sheffield, Sperm Donor Was Liablefor Support, CourtRules, HOUS. CHRON., May
27, 2007, at A10.
36. Throughout, the court refers, without analysis, to Jacob as the "biological mother." See,
e.g., Jacob,2007 PA Super. 16, 923 A.2d at 479.
37. [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 522-23 (Can.), leave to appealdeniedsub nom. Alliance for
Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
38. Id. at 525. The court does not explicitly identify the type of conception, stating only that
the friend provided "assistance" to the lesbian couple. See id. at 522.
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Institute's ("ALI's") Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations,39 a project designed to explain family
law decisions and to guide decisionmakers, including courts, legislators,
administrators, and affected individuals 4 0-and an oft-cited bMte noire of

those criticizing family law's evolving departure from a marriagecentered regime.41 In recognizing different parental categories based on
specified formalities and behaviors, namely legal parents, parents by
estoppel, and de facto parents,42 the Principlesestablish the architecture
for allocating custody and child support following family dissolution.
Although most of the illustrations used in the Principlesreveal a scheme

that contemplates no more than two parents for a given child,43the
definitions and criteria leave open the possibility of a larger number.

As all these authorities suggest, parental status is important for
several reasons. Under familiar doctrines of family law, parental status
confers parental rights, specifically presumptive constitutional and
44
common-law protection for childrearing decisions (parental autonomy)
and for time to spend with the child (even over the objection of another

39.

See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) (recognizing and implementing various criteria for recognizing parental
rights and obligations, in addition to biology, marriage, and adoption).
40. Id. at xvii-xviii. The Principlesexplicitly seek not only to shape the choices made by
legislators, courts, and administrative bodies, but also to encourage private ordering by making
predictable the outcomes that would obtain in the absence of settlement. See id. at 1-6.
41. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILY LAW, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY
LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH AMERICA (2005) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF
FAMILY LAW] (report sponsored by Institute for American Values; Institute for Marriage and Public
Policy; and Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law and Culture); RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
(Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). The Future of Family Law lists as sponsors most of the
organizations that also sponsored The Revolution in Parenthood.See THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW,
supra; THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 4. In addition, one of these
organizations, the Institute for American Values, also sponsored the workshop that produced
Reconceiving the Family. RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra, at xi.
42. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1).
43. See id. § 2.03 illus. 1-27. Illustrations 5 and 10 leave open the possibility that, under state
law, a child might have two parents along with the parent by estoppel recognized by the Principles.
Id. § 2.03 illus. 5, 10. Illustrations 13 and 14 involve three parental candidates but recognition of
one depends on the agreement or the "dropp[ing] out" of another. Id. § 2.03 illus. 13-14. In other
illustrations, the facts identify two parties while avoiding references to other individuals who might
be considered parents. E.g., id. § 2.03 illus. 16-17. Illustration 27, however, depicts a situation in
which a child has two parents and a de facto parent-without saying so explicitly. Id. § 2.03 illus.
27; see also id. § 3.03 (making the question whether a child already has two parents a factor in
determining whether to recognize a parent by estoppel); Katharine K. Baker, Asymmetric
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 41, at 121, 128 (showing how the
Principlesadhere to a two-parent model for support, but a more expansive model for custody).
44. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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parent).45 Generally, fit parents may control others' access to the child,46
and parents enjoy a "parental preference" for custody4 7 and
guardianship.48 Often, those who are not parents (usually called "third
parties" 49 or "legal strangers" 50 ) lack standing even to seek continued
contact with a child with whom they have shared a relationship.51
Likewise, parental status also imposes parental obligations,
including responsibilities for care and support of the child.52 Indeed, to
the extent that family law expresses a strong preference for private
support of children, 53 increasing the number of recognized parents offers
more resources and a more effective buffer against dependence on the
state. Although it stopped short of recognizing more than two parents,
the California Supreme Court in Elisa B. v. Superior Court clearly
signaled that such financial objectives justify departing from traditional
rules of parentage to recognize that a child can have two mothers, even
without an adoption. 54 It is not much of a stretch to conclude that, if
45. Courts have recognized visitation with a child as a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. See, e.g., Swipies v. Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2005); Franz v. United States, 712
F.2d 1428, 1431-33 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Courts will restrict visitation, including requiring supervision,
or deny visitation if necessary to protect the child from harm, however. See D. KELLY WEISBERG &
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 777-89 (3d ed. 2006)
(reprinting and discussing cases and other materials on the standards for denying or restricting
visitation).
46. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (plurality opinion).
47. The presumption is often stated in terms of a preference for a "biological" or "natural"
parent. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 2005 PA Super 337,
10-12, 884 A.2d 915, 917-18 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005); Brian Bix, Philosophy, Morality, and ParentalPriority,40 FAM. L.Q. 7 (2006); see also,
e.g., LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, STATE INTERVENTION, CUSTODY AND
DIVORCE: CONTRADICTIONS IN ETHICS AND FAMILY LAW 162-71 (2005) (discussing the "biological
preference principle" under which biological parents always have priority).
48. See, e.g., Fischer v. Fischer, 157 P.3d 682, 685-86 (Mont. 2007); see also Freeman v.
Rushton, 202 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Ark. 2005) (noting that the preference gives way to the child's best
interests).
49. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Family Boundaries: Third-Party Rights and Obligations
with Respect to Children,40 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 (2006).
50. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternityfor Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 350 (2002).
51. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27,29 (N.Y. 1991). Some states give some
third parties standing in certain circumstances, however. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(5)(5)
(West 2003); In re C.R.C., 148 P.3d 458, 463 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). Regarding applicable
constitutional limitations, see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
52. See, e.g., Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 173
(2003); Baker, Bargainingor Biology?, supra note 18, at 7-8.
53. See, e.g., Baker, Bargainingor Biology?, supra note 18, at 20.
54. 117 P.3d 660, 665-66 (Cal. 2005). In this action by the county to collect child support, the
court held that
a woman who agreed to raise children with her lesbian partner, supported her partner's
artificial insemination using an anonymous donor, and received the resulting twin
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private money were the only issue, the more parents per child, the
better.55 Shultz-Jacob's recognition of a third parent with some child
support obligations 56 may be seen in this light.
The opponents of multi-parentage invoke many of the same
developments cited by the supporters while reflecting very different
underlying assumptions. The Revolution in Parenthoodwarns about the
dangers of "[r]edefining [p]arenthood" and the "[i]ncreasing [s]lippage
in the [m]eaning of [f]atherhood and [m]otherhood, ''57 implying that
these terms have fixed understandings, rather than content based on
evolving legal and social constructions. 8 Decrying the active role of the
state in shaping the contours of parenthood, 59 the report's analysis
sounds the alarm about both divorce and the rise of assisted
reproduction. In so doing, it reveals that the allure of a bi-parentage rule
lies in its ability to naturalize a normative family in which only
enduringly monogamous heterosexual couples reproduce. 60 This position
embodies a strong version of what Baker calls "bionormativity. 6 1
For example, The Revolution in Parenthoodcondemns specifically
Canada's recent replacement in federal law of the term "natural parent"
with the term "legal parent." 62 Yet, the notion of legal parents is far from
revolutionary. Justice Scalia, expressing his commitment to narrow
traditional understandings of the family, has invoked the notion of legal
parenthood to side with the arguments of a mother's husband, over the
asserted claims of a biological father, in a dispute about the
children into her home and held them out as her own, is the children's parent under the
Uniform Parentage Act and has an obligation to support them.
Id.at 662. In a footnote, the court remarked, "We have not decided 'whether there exists an
overriding legislative policy limiting a child to two parents."' Id. at 666 n.4 (quoting Sharon S. v.
Superior Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 561 n.6 (Cal. 2003)).
55. Baker and Kessler so suggest. See Baker, supra note 11, at 673-76; Kessler, supra note
10, at 72.
21, 24, 923 A.2d 473, 481-82 (Pa. Super.
56. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 2007 PA Super. 118,
Ct. 2007).
57. THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 22.

58. See generally, e.g., Barbara Stark, Review Essay: Pomo Parenting,80 OR. L. REV. 1035
(2001) (reviewing JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW (2000) and NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD (2000)) (both examining the
expanding understanding of "parenting").
59. See THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 6; cf DWYER, supra note 7, at 26
(explaining that the state is always involved in identifying parents, even when it chooses to rely on
biological criteria).
60. One finds a similar approach in an earlier report sponsored by the same organizations. See
THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 41; see also supra note 16. Baker thoroughly examines
the reasons why "bionormativity" might prove attractive. Baker, supra note 11.
61. Baker, supra note 11, at653.
62. THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 10-11.
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constitutionality of the presumption of legitimacy. Moreover, the term
"natural parent" has no inherent magic or invariable meaning. California
law permits an unmarried man who has reared a child to be a "natural
father," despite evidence showing that they share no biological
connection. 64 The absence of parental status historically for unmarried
fathers 65 and, today, for most sperm donors 66 illustrates a larger principle
that undermines any simplistic attempt to equate parentage with biology
or genetics. Indeed, even without functional tests, family law would face
the possibility of multi-parentage, thanks to reproductive techniques
that
67 or even genetic parents. 68
biological
three
permit
to
promise
B. Family Law's "Deconstruction"of Parenthood
Just as the opponents of multi-parentage inaccurately depict
traditional family law principles, the supporters rely on assumptions that
contemporary family law has now left behind. Claiming that family law
has considerably more work to do before operationalizing a multi-parent
regime, the supporters envision parenthood, however it might be
determined, as a bundle of rights and responsibilities that for legal
purposes is treated as a comprehensive, exclusive, and indivisible unit.6 9
For example, Jacobs and the other supporters call for reforms that would
disaggregate the bundle that flows from parentage in order to expand the
number of parents who can participate. 70 In my view, these supporters

63. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
64. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 933, 941 (Cal. 2002).
65.

See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971)

(exploring the historical treatment of the nonmarital child as 'filius nullius").
66. See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. Hendrix v.
Harrington, 129 S. Ct. 36 (2008); Ferguson v. McKieman, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
67. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 676 (Cal. 2005).
68. See, e.g., THE REVOLUTION INPARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 27.
69. In 1984, Professor Katharine Bartlett used this description in inviting readers to think
outside the familiar legal box of unified parenthood. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the

Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 883, 944-45 (1984).
70. Jacobs urges that "[b]y disaggregating the strands of parentage, it becomes possible to
recognize the many individuals who play a role in the child's life." Jacobs, supra note 7, at 325. In
addition, Kessler, in advocating community parenting, asserts that to achieve this goal, "we [first]
may need to further disaggregate the bundle of parental rights." Kessler, supra note 10, at 74. And
Baker considers the possibility of"separat[ing] out obligations for children from rights to children."
Baker, supra note 11, at 696. For additional discussion of this possibility, see infra notes 157-67 and
accompanying text.
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overstate the need for reforms because they understate the extent to
which such disaggregation has already occurred. 7'
Today, almost every state has well-established rules for a division
of the "parenthood pie" after dissolution of marriage, with courts
routinely making separate decisions about the child's legal custody (also
called decisionmaking authority) and the child's physical custody (also
called residential time).72 Likewise, child support is no longer an
indivisible obligation but rather a duty to be apportioned between the
parents (and occasionally the state).73
Sometimes, a court will order an even more finely tuned division.
For example, in attempting to resolve custody disputes between parents
who practice different religions, some courts have carved out special
awards of "spiritual custody," as distinguished from the prerogative of
making other decisions or inculcating secular values-though not
without raising questions under the First Amendment.74
The recent advent of parenting plans shows just how detailed such
post-dissolution allocations of time with, responsibilities for, and duties
to children have become.7 5 States commonly require each divorcing
parent to submit to the court a blueprint that will inform, but not bind,
the court in adjudicating custody.7 6 Such parenting plans, which also
77 typically cover
occupy an important position in the ALI's Principles,
three primary incidents of parentage-physical custody, legal custody
(or decisionmaking), and financial obligations. For example, Missouri's
statutory framework for a parenting plan, which each party must file

71. Analogously, one can discern an "unbundling" of the rights and responsibilities that
traditionally have constituted marriage. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 31 (2003).
72. E.g., Bell v. Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1990); see PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 cmt. a (2002).

73. The Federal Advisory Panel on Child Support Guidelines listed as one objective the
principle that both parents should share responsibility for child support. See LAURA W. MORGAN,
CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION § 1.02(d) (Supp. 2003).

74. See Jordan C. Paul, Comment, "You Get the House. I Get the Car. You Get the Kids. I Get
Their Souls. " The Impact of Spiritual Custody Awards on the Free Exercise Rights of Custodial
Parents, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 583 (1989); see also Jeffrey Shulman, Spiritual Custody: Relational
Rights and ConstitutionalCommitments, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 317 (2005).

75.

The Principlesmake parenting plans central to child custody decisions following family

dissolution. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 6-7.

76. Still, parents cannot bargain away the rights of their children, whose best interests control,
notwithstanding possible unfairness to the parents. See, e.g., Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684-85
(N.M. Ct. App. 2001); D'Amico v. Ellinwood, 149 P.3d 277, 283 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). But see
Ferguson v. McKieman, 940 A.2d 1236, 1246-47 (Pa. 2007) (upholding sperm donor's agreement
with the child's mother that he would have no parental responsibilities).
77.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 6.
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when seeking dissolution of marriage, subdivides each of these primary
incidents as follows, requiring:
(1) A specific written schedule detailing the custody, visitation and
residential time for each child with each party including: (a) Major
holidays stating which holidays a party has each year; (b) School
holidays for school age children; (c) The child's birthday, Mother's
Day and Father's Day; (d) Weekday and weekend schedules and for
school age children how the winter, spring, summer and other
vacations from school will be spent; (e) The times and places for
transfer of the child between the parties in connection with the
residential schedule; (f) A plan for sharing transportation duties
associated with the residential schedule; (g) Appropriate times for
telephone access; (h) Suggested procedures for notifying the other
party when a party requests a temporary variation from the residential
schedule; (i) Any suggested restrictions or limitations on access to a
party and the reasons such restrictions are requested;
(2) A specific written plan regarding legal custody which details how
the decision-making rights and responsibilities will be shared between
the parties including the following: (a) Educational decisions and
methods of communicating information from the school to both
parties; (b) Medical, dental and health care decisions including how
health care providers will be selected and a method of communicating
medical conditions of the child and how emergency care will be
handled; (c) Extracurricular activities, including a method for
determining which activities the child will participate in when those
activities involve time during which each party is the custodian; (d)
Child care providers, including how such providers will be selected;
(e) Communication procedures including access to telephone numbers
as appropriate; (f) A dispute resolution procedure for those matters on
which the parties disagree or in interpreting the parenting plan; (g) If a
party suggests no shared decision-making, a statement of the reasons
for such a request;
(3) How the expenses of the child, including child care, educational
and extraordinary expenses as defined in the child support guidelines
established by the supreme court, will be paid including: (a) The
suggested amount of child support to be paid by each party; (b) The
party who will maintain or provide health insurance for the child and
how the medical, dental, vision, psychological and other health care
expenses of the child not paid by insurance will be paid by the parties;
(c) The payment of educational expenses, if any; (d) The payment of
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extraordinary expenses of the child, if any; (e) Child care expenses, if
any; (f) Transportation expenses, if any.
Such outlines for parenting plans, now mainstays of contemporary
custody adjudication, reveal that the law does not presently
conceptualize parenthood as a comprehensive and indivisible monolith,
but rather as a mosaic capable of division and subdivision even in the
ordinary case. And with so many discrete elements of "parenting" listed,
a plan could easily accommodate two, three, or more parents.
Further, recent scholarship has begun to recognize the legal
significance of parental "outsourcing" of some childrearing
functions 79 whether in intact or post-dissolution families. Certainly,
nannies and day careworkers have become ubiquitous today.80 Indeed,
particularly now that home schooling is no longer an uncommon
practice,81 we might think of even public and private schools as places
where specific activities that could be performed by parents are
delegated to others. But even if education is in a class by itself, still
82
many childrearing activities are performed "between home and school
by those whom the law does not regard as parents. 83 The point of citing
these phenomena here is not to contend that the adults performing these
activities should be considered "parents," 84 but rather to reinforce the
idea that parenthood, as practiced and understood, consists of many parts
that can be disaggregated and delegated. Childrearing takes place in bits
and pieces.
Finally, family law has developed a rich vocabulary communicating
multiple layers of the parenting enterprise, with roles to be played by or
at least recognized for different individuals. Case law, statutes, and the
literature now comfortably discuss a variety of types of parents-foster
parents, birth parents, biological parents, intended parents, adoptive
parents, legal parents, genetic parents, gestational parents (or mothers),

78. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.310 (7) (West 2003).
79. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REv. 385, 390-91 (2008); Laura A. Rosenbury, Between
Home andSchool, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 833,834-35 (2007).
80. But see Jodi Kantor, Nanny Hunt Can Be a "Slap in the Face"for Blacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2006, at Al.
81. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 124-25 (2008).
82. Rosenbury, supra note 79, at 834.
83. Murray, supra note 79, at 390; Rosenbury, supra note 79, at 846.
84. See Murray, supranote 79, at 393-94.
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surrogate parents (or mothers), de facto parents, parents by estoppel,
and
85
psychological parents-to name the most prominent examples.
These developments, with family law's increasing acknowledgment
of the sharing of parental tasks and roles, lowers any conceptual hurdle
of parenthood's supposed indivisibility.86 Further, on an operational
level, family law already routinely practices disaggregation of parental
rights and responsibilities. Put differently, although some supporters of
multi-parentage correctly observe that political discourse makes
invisible some of a child's affiliations with more than two adults and
case law often exhibits hostility to recognizing more than two legal
parents for a given child, 87 one could just as easily see the glass as half
full, instead of half empty. Today, an analysis of multi-parentage can
unfold against a legal background that might be deployed quite
supportively of the project.
III.

SOME UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN FAMILY LAW'S
TREATMENT OF PARENTAGE

Despite the evolution of important conceptual and operational tools
permitting recognition of more than two legal parents, several aspects of
family law's treatment of parentage remain underdeveloped and
inadequate, given the contemporary emphasis on behavior and function.
Although these gaps exist even within the more familiar regime of biparentage, the possibility of multi-parentage remains sufficiently
unfamiliar and disorienting that it makes these gaps more visible. This
Part considers the need for family law to do more work on four specific
issues.

85. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 826 (1977)
(noting New York's division of parental functions among the child welfare agency, foster parents,
and natural parents); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (resolving a parentage dispute in
favor of the genetic, intended parents and against the gestational surrogate); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 204 (a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 2008) (presumed parentage based on "holding
out" child as one's own); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (2002) (formulating criteria for "parent[s] by estoppel" and "de facto
parent[s]"); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (new ed.

1979) (developing the concept of a "psychological parent"); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 WiS. L.
REV. 297, 322-23 (proposing theory of parentage based on intent); cf THE FUTURE OF FAMILY
LAW, supra note 41, at 37-38 (criticizing the recognition of different forms of parenting as
"fragmentation of parenthood").
86. See Bartlett, supra note 69, at 883.
87. See Kessler, supra note 10, at 59-62, 65-72.
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A. What Functions Count? Caregivers,Breadwinners,and Nannies
Family law currently relies on functional as well as formal and
biological criteria in deciding what relationships to recognize, as shown
by Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob88 and A.A. v. B.B., 89 and this is so in many biparentage cases as well.90 This contemporary reliance on function
requires, as a threshold matter, identifying what behaviors trigger
parental status and when performing acts that parents stereotypically
perform does not entail such legal consequences. The exercise requires
line-drawing, as illustrated by the Pennsylvania court's careful analysis
of the roles in the children's lives played by both Shultz-Jacob and
Frampton. 91 The court's emphasis on the semen donor's particular
relationship with the child signals that not all semen donors-and not
even all known semen donors-would merit parental status.92 Supporters
of multi-parentage appreciate the need for such line-drawing in order to
avoid undesired consequences; for example, Kessler cautions that she
has no intention of routinely "elevating sperm donors, mere ex-lovers,
and babysitters to the status of parent." 93 Others also envision
recognition of an expansive group providing parent-like care for children
but assume that enlarging the legal understanding of "parent" need not
follow. 94 The more debatable the governing criteria and their application,
however, the more necessary state intervention becomes, with a
corresponding diminution of family autonomy that alarms some
scholars. 95
Despite the importance of clarifying the standards for functional
parentage, existing authorities reflect no consensus. Further, examination

88. 2007 PA Super. 118, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
89. [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub nom. Alliance for
Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
90. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550-52 (N.J. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 967-68, 971 (R.I. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 169, 176-77 (Wash.
2005). But see, e.g., Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008); Stadter v. Siperko, 661
S.E.2d 494, 498-99 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
10-11, 21, 923 A.2d at 477-78, 481.
91. Jacob, 2007 PA Super.
92. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania subsequently confirmed that not all known semen
donors have the legal status of parent. Ferguson v. McKieman, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007); see
also In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1040-41 (Kan. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. Hendrix v.
Harrington, 129 S.Ct. 36 (2008).
93. Kessler, supranote 10, at 76.
94. See Murray, supra note 79, at 410-15; Rosenbury, supra note 79, at 878-80.
95. See Baker, supra note 11, at 681, 699. As others note, however, the state is always
involved because, even under rules basing parentage exclusively on biology, the rules come from
the state. See DWYER, supra note 7, at 26, 135.
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reveals

difficulties

and

inconsistencies that must be confronted even in bi-parentage cases.
One version of a functional test is illustrated by recent cases from
Massachusetts 96 and Kentucky. 97 These cases, in which the courts

considered whether or not to recognize a second parent for a child,
impose significant outer limits by holding that only caretaking functions,
that is, activities in which an adult engages in parent-like activities

involving direct interaction with the child, can trigger de facto parent
status. These courts reject the argument that other functions that parents
are expected to perform, specifically providing financial and material

support, can alone confer parental status. As a result, both courts
declined to recognize as a parent a mother's former partner who had
primarily performed the role of breadwinner, rather than caretaker, while
the family remained intact.98
This approach no doubt reflects the powerful legacy of the concept
of "psychological parent," as formulated by psychoanalysts-child
advocates Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, who focused on the harm that
the child would experience if an ongoing relationship with an adult
whom he or she regarded as a parent were disrupted, regardless of that

adult's official status with respect to the child. 99 Because of the influence
of this idea, 100 frequently the recognition of functional parents has
sought to emphasize the view from the child's perspective and the
child's emotional need for continuing the relationship. 10 1 This emphasis

should come as no surprise, given the iconic status of the child's best
interests in child custody adjudication. 102 Thus, it follows, as in the
96. A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1071 (Mass. 2006).
97. B.F.v.T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310, 311-12 (Ky. 2006).
98. In the Massachusetts case, the court declined to recognize a breadwinner as a de facto
parent and rejected the doctrine of parent by estoppel. A.H., 857 N.E.2d at 1072-75. In the Kentucky
case, the court held that the adoptive mother's former partner failed to show she was the child's
primary caregiver and thus did not satisfy the test for "de facto custodian" and lacked standing to
raise other claims, based on in loco parentis.B.F., 194 S.W.3d at 311-12; see also, e.g., Heatzig v.
MacLean, 664 S.E.2d 347, 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt doctrine of parent by
estoppel), appealdismissed by No. 418P08, 2008 WL 5484382 (N.C. Dec. 11, 2008).
99. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 85, at 18-20.
100. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a Book Out... ": An Analysis of JudicialAbsorption
of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1987).
101. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551-52 (N.J. 2000) (adopting four-part test for
recognition of "psychological parenthood" and identifying as the "most important" criterion the
"forg[ing]" of a "parent-child bond").
102. See, e.g., MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 121-60 (1994) (exploring the history and

development of the best interest standard). A classic illustration is Painterv. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d
152, 157 (Iowa 1966), in which the court relied on an expert's testimony that child's best interests
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Massachusetts and Kentucky courts, that only day-to-day interactions
and the child's resulting emotional attachments and perceptions provide
the pivotal criteria.
A contrasting, and much more complex, approach appears in the
ALI's Principles, which spell out distinct criteria for legal parents,
parents by estoppel, and de facto parents. 10 3 According to the Principles,
legal parents are defined by state law. 10 4 Parents by estoppel may derive
their status solely because of an obligation to pay child support or a
reasonable good faith belief, while living with the child for at least two
years, of biological parentage. Alternatively, parenthood by estoppel can
arise from living with the child and "holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent," either since the child's birth,
pursuant to a co-parenting agreement, or for two years, pursuant to an
agreement with the child's parent or parents, and in the child's best
15
interests.
0 In contrast, to be a de facto parent, the adult must have lived
with the child
and
for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the
agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a
result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform
caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed the majority of the
caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly performed a share
of caretaking functions at least10 6 as great as that of the parent with
whom the child primarily lived.

In implementing this taxonomy, the Principles follow a hierarchal
approach, with parents by estoppel accorded the same prerogatives as
legal parents 10 7 and both of these granted priority over de facto parents
for primary custody and presumptive joint decisionmaking responsibility
after dissolution. 10 8 Thus, to the extent that these definitions are

dictated the continued custody of the maternal grandparents, whom he regarded as "his parental
figures in his psychological makeup," despite his father's suit for his son's return. But see DWYER,
supranote 7, at 24 (contending that many of our rules show that family law does not make children
and their welfare paramount); ef infra notes 321-60.
103. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
104. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03(l)(a) (2002).
105. Id. § 2.03(l)(b).
106. Id. § 2.03(l)(c) (emphasis added).
107. Id. § 2.03 cmt. b.
108. Parents by estoppel have all the same privileges as legal parents, including "priority over a
de facto parent and a nonparent in the allocation of primary custodial responsibility .... Id. § 2.03
cmt. b. Further, "[t]he court should presume that an allocation of decisionmaking responsibility
jointly to each legal parent or parent by estoppel who has been exercising a reasonable share of [the]
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gendered, with the criteria for parents by estoppel deriving primarily
from paternity cases' 0 9 and those for de facto parents evoking women's
traditionally disproportionate share of domestic carework," 0 the
Principles'hierarchy ranks men above women.
Against this background, two specific features of the Principles'
scheme merit a closer look, and both turn on money. First, the Principles
establish outer limits by delineating circumstances that disqualify one
from parental status. Thus, only when one acts "for reasons primarily
other than financial compensation""' does the performance of
caretaking functions count toward establishing de facto parenthood,12
Although a child might well form deep emotional attachments to a paid
caregiver (say, a nanny), according to the Principles, the assumptions
about "motivations" of "love and loyalty" that justify the responsibility
the law accords to parents do not apply to "adults who have provided
caretaking functions primarily for financial reasons."" 3 Whether or not
reliance on the generalized and intuitive assumptions that underlie this
"nanny rule" is consistent with an approach that promises to emphasize
function, ' 14 emotional attachment, and the child's interests, this
boundary illustrates one effort to distinguish what counts from what
does not.
Second, in contrast to the approach followed in Massachusetts and
Kentucky, the Principles permit parental status based on the
performance of functions that do not entail caretaking. To be sure, the
Principles recognize the differences among parental functions, defining
caretaking functions as the subset of parenting activities that consist of
"tasks that involve interaction with the child or that direct, arrange, and
supervise the interaction and care provided by others[,]"' 1 5 while
excluding from this subset other parenting functions, such as providing
economic support, participating in decisionmaking, maintaining or
parenting functions is in the child's best interests." Id. § 2.09(2); see infra note 195 and
accompanying text.
109. Most of the cases cited by the Reporter's Notes to comment b, about parents by estoppel,
are paternity cases, although more recent cases about lesbian co-parents have broadened the reach of
the doctrine. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03 rptr. notes cmt. b; see
also Appleton, supra note 24, at 240-42.

110. Even the United States Supreme Court has noted the traditionally gendered nature of
domestic carework. See Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
111.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(I)(c)(ii) cmt. c.ii (discussing de

facto parents).
112.
113.

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03 cmt. c.ii.

114. See id. § 2.03 cmt. c.
115.

Id. § 2.03(5).
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improving the family residence, purchasing food and clothing or
undertaking financial planning for the family, 11 6 or "performing any
other functions that are customarily performed by a parent or guardian
and that are important to a child's welfare and development."' 17 But,
unlike in Massachusetts and Kentucky, one who performs caretaking is
not necessarily privileged in the effort to secure recognition as a parent
over one who performs other parenting activities.
Accordingly, the Principlesrecognize "parents by estoppel," based
on the provision of child support, and they treat parents by estoppel as
legal parents. 18 Similarly, the Principles impose a presumptive floor on
time allocated after dissolution to all legal parents and parents by
estoppel who have performed a reasonable share of parenting functions,
caretaking or otherwise. 1 9 Finally, arguably turning the Massachusetts
and Kentucky approach on its head, under the Principles, de facto
parents, who acquire their status on the basis of caretaking activities,
take a back seat to legal parents and parents by estoppel when it comes
to primary 120custody and presumptive joint decisionmaking
responsibility.
The Principles' treatment of functions that do not entail caretaking,
which departs from the special emphasis that Goldstein and his coauthors placed on interactions and a child's resulting emotional
attachments, 12 1 no doubt has several sources. In part, however, it reflects
a response to arguments by fathers' rights advocates, who resisted any
privilege to be accorded to caretaking functions. They had contended
that, instead, the Principlesshould place on a par the role stereotypically
played by men (that is, providing economic support, doing home repairs,
etc.) and the role stereotypically played by women (that is, giving care

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. § 2.03(6)(a)-(d).
Id. § 2.03(6)(e).
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.08(l)(a). But see id.

§ 2.08(1)(d).
120. See supra note 108. In addition, the Principles permit caretaking individuals who are not
parents at all to receive some custody. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 3.02(7).
Section 3.02 defines "caretaker" as "a person who is not a parent.., but who nevertheless is
I..."
Id.
At the same time, however,
allocated and exercises residential or custodial responsibility .
the Principlescaution in section 2.18 that the court "should limit or deny an allocation otherwise to
be made if, in light of the number of other individuals to be allocated responsibility, the allocation
would be impractical." Id. § 2.18(l)(b) (emphasis added).
121. But see Baker, supra note 43, at 133-34 (contending that the Principles value children's
emotional needs over their material needs because de facto parents have no financial obligations).
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directly or arranging therefor). 122 These advocates got some of the parity
they sought, in the form of a floor on custodial time and presumptively
joint decisionmaking responsibility for noncaretaking parents. 123 If one
also considers in this context the Principles' treatment of parents by
estoppel, however, then functions stereotypically performed by fathers
124
arguably count for more than mothers' stereotypical conduct.
Thus, the contrasting approaches of the Massachusetts and
Kentucky courts, on the one hand, and the Principles, on the other,
spotlight an issue that requires resolution even in a bi-parentage regime
and becomes even more notable as the number of possible parents
increases: When parental status comes from function and behavior, what
counts? Moreover, neither approach proves entirely satisfactory. The
approach used in Massachusetts and Kentucky is problematic because
the failure to recognize parental status for one who provided financial
support leaves a child in a precarious economic situation, given both the
privatization of child support and the usual assumption that only those
125
with parental rights should shoulder parental obligations.
The Principles' approach overcomes this particular difficulty by
recognizing parents by estoppel on the basis of financial support. Yet,
122. In making this argument, fathers' rights advocates were seeking to enlarge stereotypical
fathers' opportunities for custody after dissolution. Their claim that divisions of labor in the intact
family should not dictate the consequences of dissolution resembles arguments made by feminists in
favor of a partnership theory of marriage, which in turn allowed homemakers after dissolution to
share in the property acquired by breadwinners during marriage. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman,
Dividing Financial Interests at Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 139-41
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (exploring partnership theory); Alicia Brokars
Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution at Divorce: In
Recognition ofa Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 199-203 (2004).
123. According to Katharine Bartlett, the Reporter who drafted these sections of the ALI's
Principles, fathers' rights advocates were not influential in the development of the concept of
parents by estoppel, even if their arguments did strengthen the minimal allocation of custodial time
under § 2.08(l)(a) and did help produce a presumption in favor of joint decisionmaking
responsibility under § 2.09(2). E-mail from Katharine T. Bartlett, A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law,
Duke Law School, to Susan Frelich Appleton, Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of
Law, Washington University School of Law (Sept. 23, 2008, 9:20 CST) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review).
124. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 140-67 and accompanying text for additional exploration of this issue. No
doubt, the assumed link between parental rights and obligations explains why some courts have
conferred parental status based on the past provision of child support or the promise to do so. See,
e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 669-70 (Cal. 2005) (noting that Elisa functioned as
breadwinner while Emily served as primary caregiver); supra note 54; see also, e.g., H.M. v.E.T.,
No. U-1 10-07, slip op. at 4-6 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007) (using equitable estoppel and implied contract to
impose support duties on mother's former partner). But see Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d
27, 28-29 (N.Y. 1991) (declining to recognize mother's former partner as co-parent in dispute about
visitation).
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the Principles raise a different difficulty because of their distinction
between paid and unpaid caregivers. 126 To the extent that the "child's
eyes" should provide the controlling perspective in recognizing those
who acquire status on the basis of caretaking, distinctions based on
payment should remain irrelevant. The Principles' skepticism about the
"love and loyalty" of paid caregivers probably reflects longstanding
efforts to maintain a divide between intimate relationships and economic
exchanges.1 27 This skepticism also no doubt masks unarticulated value
judgments and adherence to a status quo in which parents with
commitments outside the home can rely on nannies without risking
diminution of their own privileged status vis-?i-vis the child. 128 As other
scholars have noted, the prevailing understanding of caregiving rests on
a racialized and class-based hierarchy that values interactions with
children depending on who performs them. 129 Thus, even when mothers
working outside the home and nannies perform the same caregiving
tasks at different times of the day, we tend to use terms like "quality
30

time" for the former and regard the latter as more menial functions.

126. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
127. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REv. 491 (2005)
(debunking any such strict divide).
128. Consider, for example, the language of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in
rejecting the arguments of a couple who had cared for the child and then asserted a shared parenting
agreement and standing as psychological co-parents:
Virtually any parent who must rely upon child care, whether to allow the parent to work,
attend school, care for elderly parents, visit the doctor, or for any other reason, could
potentially face a challenge from the child's care giver asserting the existence of a shared
parenting arrangement despite the absence of any writing evincing such an intent by the
parent. We simply cannot condone a ruling that would permit such pervasive
interference with parents' custodial rights....
... [S]imply caring for a child is not enough to bestow upon a care giver psychological
parent status. Were this the law of the State, any person, from day care providers and
babysitters to school teachers and family friends, who cares for a child on a regular basis
and with whom the child has developed a relationship of trust could claim to be the
child's psychological parent and seek an award of the child's custody to the exclusion of
the child's parent.
In re Custody and Visitation of Senturi N.S.V., 652 S.E.2d 490, 497-99 (W. Va. 2007); see also
Jensen v. Bevard, 168 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that care during many
weekends, while a parent works, does not suffice to create a parent-child relationship under the
statute). See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, The Networked-Yet Still Hierarchical-Family,94
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 31 (2008), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/09/01/appleton.pdf
(2008) (exploring the implications of Murray's proposal for gender stereotypes and issues of race
and class); Murray, supra note 79 (arguing for legal recognition of caregiving by nonparents); see
also Hasday, supra note 127, at 516.
129. E.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritualand Menial Housework, 9 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 51,
55-59 (1997); see also BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD 135-42 (Rutgers

Univ. Press 2000) (1989).
130. See Roberts, supra note 129, at 57.
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Thus, the "nanny rule" reflects and legitimizes this hierarchy-without
questioning its foundations.' 31 Similarly, drawing a boundary at paid
caregiving allows the state to rely on subsidized
foster parents without
32
threatening the primacy of the family of origin. 1
The prospect of multi-parentage brings new urgency to confronting
these largely unacknowledged departures from family law's professed
commitment to child's interests, because-for example-expanded
parental numbers could comfortably make room for a nanny or foster
parent, in addition to a traditional couple. Even under a "rule of two,"
however, the embrace of functional tests raises questions that family law
has not definitively answered.
B. Imposing ParentalObligations
Most of the supporters of multi-parentage write primarily as if the
issue arises only from a possible surfeit of volunteers-adults seeking
parental status and the concomitant opportunity to exercise parental
rights.'33 And, in fact, in the Pennsylvania and Ontario cases recognizing

131. For a critique of this rule, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money Caregiving, and Kinship:
Should Paid Caregivers Be Allowed to Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 Mo. L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2009) (manuscript cited with the author's permission, on file with author).
132. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46
(1977). According to comments in the Principles, "Relationships with foster parents
are... generally excluded, both because of the financial compensation involved and because
inclusion of foster parents would undermine the integrity of a state-run system designed to provide
temporary, rather than indefinite, care for children." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmt. c.ii (2002); see also id § 2.03 illus.
19-20.
133. For example, Kessler's analysis assumes multiple claimants vying for parental rights
against a norm that limits such status to two. See Kessler, supra note 10, at 74 ("more potential
claimants"). The only reference in text to the imposition of parental responsibilities on an unwilling
adult appears in a sentence describing another scholar's work. See id. at 76 ("June Carbone has
suggested that recognizing functional parents ex post through equitable doctrines unfairly imposes
obligations on people who did not agree to them." (citing June Carbone, The Legal Definition of
Parenthood- Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295 (2005))). Jacobs
makes similar assumptions, referring frequently to parental "rights" and "claims of parenthood."
See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 7, at 314. She considers, however, a possible obligation that might be
imposed on those whom her expanded definition of "parents" would include, "perhaps donors [of
genetic material for use in assisted reproduction] should be required to provide contact information,
health histories, and perhaps even a picture." Id. at 337. To be sure, in interrogating
"bionormativity" and the resulting preference for binary parentage, Baker devotes a considerable
part of her analysis to state-imposed child support obligations and their rationale. See Baker, supra
note 11, at 664-71. Yet, when she considers the possibility of more than two parents, her focus shifts
to competing claimants, asserting parental rights. See id. at 680-81, 683, 697-98.
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three legal parents, all the adults were ready,
willing, and able to
134
perform at least the roles assigned by the courts.
Yet, today's official preoccupation with paternity establishment,
child support enforcement, and "personal responsibility' ' 135 indicates that
family law, in privatizing dependency, makes duty and obligation
significant-if not predominant-attributes of parental status. The effort
to determine which behaviors and functions should count under a
functional test, therefore, must include criteria for identifying the
circumstances in which family law will treat an unwilling adult as a
parent for purposes of imposing parental obligations, particularly
financial responsibility.
With regard to unwilling adults, of the three main legal incidents of
parentage, financial responsibility has become a site where we often find
arguments designed to disclaim a litigant's own parental status.' 36 Of
course, given children's dependency, parental obligations are not limited
to financial duties but include direct caretaking or arranging therefor.
Indeed, such responsibilities can be repetitive and exhausting and thus
137
might be viewed as more onerous than "mere" financial obligations.
Thus, custody and decisionmaking might most accurately be
conceptualized simultaneously as rights (to spend time with a child and
to direct the child's upbringing) and as obligations (to provide care for
the child during such time and to exercise one's judgment and
supervision). When parents at dissolution make overlapping and
competing claims for custody and decisionmaking, we envision rights at
stake. Yet, when one or more parents disclaim interest in custody or
decisionmaking, the issue evaporates-because family law compels
neither custody nor decisionmaking by parents unwilling to exercise
134. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 2007 PA Super. 118, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); A.A. v.
B.B., [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 522 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub. nom. Alliance for
Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124. In fact, in the Pennsylvania case, appellant ShultzJacob sought more than she received. She sought sole legal and primary physical custody of all four
children; the court below awarded and the appellate court affirmed shared legal custody for all four
children and primary physical custody of one child to Shultz-Jacob, with primary custody of the
other three going to Jacob. Jacob, 2007 PA Super.
3, 5, 25, 923 A.2d at 476, 482.
135. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (welfare-reform
legislation with a stated purpose of encouraging "the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families").
136. See, e.g., Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 576 (1987); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 44 P.3d 153,
154 (Alaska 2002); Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 664 (Cal. 2005); People ex rel. J.A.U. v.
R.L.C., 47 P.3d 327, 329 (Colo. 2002); T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Mass. 2004); Shondel
J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 612 (N.Y. 2006); Marriage/Children of Betty L.W. v. William E.W.,
569 S.E.2d 77, 80-81 (W. Va. 2002).
137. Cf Roberts, supranote 129, at 55-56 (noting tedium of"menial housework").
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these incidents.' 38 By contrast, family law routinely imposes financial
obligations even on parents who seek to avoid such responsibilities and
often on those seeking to extricate themselves from parental status
altogether. 139 As a result, the case of the unwilling adult is invariably a
case that concerns child support.
These observations suggest that a functional parentage test for
unwilling adults presents financial responsibility as a distinct issue
capable of analysis in isolation. Nonetheless, separate consideration of
the case of the volunteer or the claimant and that of the unwilling adult,
in fact, proves difficult because the legal understanding of parentage
reveals an assumption that couples rights

40

and obligations.'

41

As

sketched out below, by unsettling the framework in which the assumed
linkage of parental rights and obligations ordinarily operates, the
possibility of multi-parentage offers valuable insights even for the more
common bi-parentage scenario.
The assumption coupling parental rights and obligations can be
traced to a Blackstonian view of parentage as a reciprocal relationship
with both social and financial components, 42 which once included the
parent's right to the child's earnings and the child's duty, as an adult, to
support the parent in old age. 143 In more modem incarnations, this
"exchange view" treats parental obligations as the moral basis of
parental rights. '44 Critics have raised several different objections to this
conceptual framework, including its tendency to overemphasize parental
entitlements 45 and its failure to fit a world populated by unmarried,
divorced, and noncustodial parents, who might not get their money's
138. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision
Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 845, 858 (2003).
139. See, e.g., Ill. Dep't of Healthcare & Family Servs. v. Warner, 882 N.E.2d 557, 560-62 (Il.

2008) (divided court interprets statute to eliminate support duties after termination of parental rights
only when the child is sought to be adopted); In re Carr, 938 A.2d 89, 96-97 (N.H. 2007) (imposing
support duties notwithstanding agreement to relinquish all parental rights). But see, e.g., In re

T.K.Y., 205 S.W.3d 343, 353-54 (Tenn. 2006) (termination of parental rights ends future child
support responsibilities).
140. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.

141.

See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.

142. See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of PrivateResponsibility and the
PublicInterest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 122, at 166, 178-79; see also

Baker, supra note 43, at 135 (quoting Locke and Hegel for similar principle).
143.
144.

See Krause, supra note 142, at 179-80.
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE L.J. 293, 297-98 (1988).

This "exchange view" also imposes a duty of obedience on the child as the quid-pro-quo for the
parent's duty to support the child. See id

145. See, e.g., id. at 298 (observing that "this view stress[es] entitlement over responsibility,
autonomy over connectedness, self over others").
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worth. 14 6 Nonetheless, the linkage of parental rights and obligations
largely persists 147 despite the disaggregation of the various components
of parenthood now apparent from the provisions covering children in
virtually any divorce decree
and in any standard parenting plan, such as
48
the one quoted earlier.'
Moreover, the assumption that parental rights necessarily entail
parental obligations helps uncover an additional rationale for the "nanny
rule,"' 149 one problematic outer limit in a scheme that otherwise professes
to make function and attachment determinative. If performing caretaking
functions triggered parental status and parental status necessarily
imposed parental obligations, then not only the families hiring nannies
but also nannies themselves might find the employment unduly risky. So
understood, the "nanny rule" emerges as50a measure that protects nannies
from unwanted financial consequences. 1
The traditional coupling of rights and obligations thus limits the
pool of candidates for legal recognition as parents to those adults who
can fairly be required to assume parental duties, including financial
support. On this issue of fairness, no clear consensus has developed even
in bi-parentage cases, although various authorities have used estoppel,
intent, agreements, and genetics, among other factors. 151 In some cases,
child support emerges as a risk that a male assumes in exchange for the
pleasure of engaging in sexual intercourse. 52 Arguably, a common
146. See Krause, supranote 142, at 180.
147. E.g., Campbell v. Davison, 2008 WL 3582689 at *3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (holding that
termination of parental rights terminates obligation to pay future support); Smith v. Smith, 893 A.2d
934, 937 (Del. 2006) (rejecting a birth mother's objection to her former partner's standing as a de
facto parent because of the birth mother's previous suit against her former partner for child support);
In re Parentage of G.E.M., 890 N.E.2d 944, 956 (111.
App. Ct. 2008) ("no court has authority to
bifurcate parental responsibilities between affairs of the heart and financial affairs"); Dep't of Hum.
Resources ex reL Duckworth v. Kamp, 949 A.2d 43, 63-64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (holding that
court erred in allowing a man to retain parental status while relieving him of child support); Mintz
v. Zoernig, 2008 WL 5401327 at *2-*3 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that sperm donor who
assumes a parental role must pay child support, notwithstanding agreement to the contrary).
148. See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 111-14, 126-32 and accompanying text.
150. Cf Baker, supra note 43, at 135-36 (noting similar problems for stepparents); THE
FuTuRE OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 41, at 36 (noting similar problems for "a boyfriend or
girlfriend" who lives with a parent).
151. Cf Altman, supra note 52, at 176-80 (examining the problems with theories of causation,
vulnerability, and consent as rationale for child support liability).
152. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 426, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to a support obligation for an unwilling father of a child conceived after the
mother's misrepresentation about contraception); Straub v. B.M.T. ex rel. Todd, 645 N.E.2d 597,
598 (Ind. 1994); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 682-84 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); L. Pamela P. v. Frank
S.,
449 N.E.2d 713,715-16 (N.Y. 1983).
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thread connecting these different reference points is the idea of but-for
causation, in the sense that bringing a child into the world (either coitally
or through the intentional use of assisted reproduction) or creating a
situation of dependency (by assuming responsibility to the exclusion of
others' 53) justifies a legally imposed obligation, whether or not the
individual so designated is willing to function as a parent. Both the
Principles' definition of "parents by estoppel"' 54 and California's Elisa
B. case' 55 reflect this idea. Moreover, this approach, far more often than
not, produces two parents, not only because of the usual biology of
reproduction but also because of the limits on our imagination from
habitually following a "rule of two.' 56 In other words, we are so
accustomed to stopping at two parents who have child support
obligations that our concept of fairness does not readily include more.
Thinking through how to make room for more than two parents
provides an impetus to reconsider the quid-pro-quo approach to
parentage. Two alternative conceptualizations are worth considering, if
only as thought experiments. First, we might decouple parental status
from at least the financial obligations for children, perhaps continuing to
impose such obligations on two (not necessarily willing) parents but
allowing others to exercise parental prerogatives. 57 For example,
consider the current legal treatment Of grandparents, who in every state
may seek court-ordered visitation under specified circumstances but
153. See, e.g., Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. 2006).
154. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
155. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 667, 669 (Cal. 2005); see also County of San Luis
Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 844 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding mother's statutory rape
of father does not relieve him from child support, when he was a willing participant in sexual
intercourse). But see Baker, supra note 11, at 661, 664-71 (showing why causation does not provide
satisfactory rationale for support obligations).
156. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 138. James Dwyer suggests that child support obligations could "be
imposed on biological parents, even if they do not become legal parents." DWYER, supra note 7, at
267. He continues:
In the United States, most people currently think of the financial support obligation as
linked to parental status and rights, but this is morally and practically unsound, and most
family law scholars today favor a revision of the law to disconnect the support obligation
from parental rights. A financial obligation can be justified solely on the grounds of
making people take responsibility for the consequences of their past actions. If this were
not the case, the state would not currently foist parenthood on biological parents who do
not want to be social parents and impose a support obligation on them whether they seek
custody or visitation. There is therefore no need to compensate biological parents for
their financial burden by giving them parental rights as well, and doing so unjustifiably
sacrifices the welfare of the child.
Id.at 267-68. I am hypothesizing a similar approach, although I take issue with his empirical claim
about the position of "most family law scholars today." See id at 268.
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without a reciprocal financial duty.158 Although this regime distinguishes
between parents and grandparents, grandparent visitation statutes
illustrate how the law might allocate a discrete and disaggregated piece
of the bundle of parental rights without any concomitant obligation to
make child support payments. Similarly, in defining and recognizing "de
facto parents," the ALI's Principles create a class eligible for some
custodial opportunities, untethered to financial obligations. 159 Indeed,
Baker has criticized the Principles because of their unexplained
severance of parental rights and obligations and their resulting scheme of
"[a]symmetric [plarenthood," which enlarges the class of those eligible
for custodial time with a child while retaining the traditional two-parent
limit for purposes of child support. 160 As she points out, the Principles
do not even use parallel definitions
of "parent" for purposes of custody
161
respectively.
support,
child
and
Alternatively, we might set aside the notion that support for
dependents belongs in the private domain. Suppose the state provided
financial support for children's material wellbeing, just as the state now
provides for their schooling, as political candidates promise the state will
provide for their healthcare,' 62 or, as Professor Martha Fineman 163 and
others 64 urge, the state should provide for caregiving. Dollars are
fungible, regardless of their source, so we can imagine how the state
could simply provide financial resources-no strings attached-without
any risk to a child's day-to-day wellbeing, in contrast to the implications
158. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 45, at 795-98 (noting that all states have
grandparent visitation statutes but that some have been reformed after Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000)).
159. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.02 & cmt. b (2002).
160. Baker, supra note 43, at 121, 128. Baker introduces this critique by observing the
difficulty in pinpointing what makes someone financially responsible for a child. Id. at 121. Indeed,
but for the Principles' exclusion of paid caregivers, this asymmetry might offer a way out of the
problems revealed by the "nanny rule." See supranote 149 and accompanying text.
161. Baker, supra note 43, at 124-26 (comparing PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 2.03 with § 3.03).
162. See, e.g., Michael Luo, On Health Care, Affordability and Comprehensiveness, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at Al 8.
163.

See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF

DEPENDENCY (2004) (arguing that caretaking creates a collective social debt that the state should
support through economic subsidies).
164. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 75-78 (2004) (proposing caretaker resource accounts). Alstott goes
further, exploring the possibility of an affirmative obligation by the state to provide equal material
resources for children and for parents to provide "emotional and intellectual growth via continuity
of care, and moral instruction, and cultural context." Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with
Equality? The Legal Implicationsof Equalityfor Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,29 (2008).
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of envisioning a shift to the state of the other parental
functions, namely
65
physical custody and decisionmaking authority.
Of course, to the extent that family law remains stuck in the
traditional "exchange view" of parental rights and obligations, stateprovided child support cannot occur in isolation.' 66 Hence, Baker
worries that public support for children could threaten a corresponding
diminution of parental autonomy, with state conditions and supervision
attached to the funds. 167 Although Baker might well be correct as a
practical matter, as a thought experiment, a vision of public support,
with no restrictions attached, can liberate our understanding of who
should be a parent from a quid-pro-quo assumption. Family law could
then identify parents-in any number-based on other criteria
altogether, including more serious consideration of the child's
nonfinancial interests, needs, and attachments.
C. The Challenge of SharedDecisionmakingAuthority
The portrait painted by some supporters of multi-parentage is that
of the intact family-or the ongoing community.' 68 As in the scenario in
the Ontario case, A.A. v. B.B., 69 when three (or more) parents are
collaborating and the child is thriving, the case for multi-parentage
becomes especially compelling. Further, the traditional doctrine of
nonintervention generally protects functioning families from state
intrusion. 170
As shown by the opponents' position, illustrated by Marquardt's
op-ed piece, however, the prospect of multi-parentage becomes much
more controversial upon the community's dissolution.17 ' Indeed, all
signs indicate that the animosity, possessiveness, factual contests, and
165. Obviously, one can argue that financial support cannot be isolated from other parental
functions, because how much one spends on a child reflects one's choices about childrearing and
hence implicates parental autonomy. See, e.g., Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 457 n.24 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2001) (reciting this argument); cf Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770-

71 (2008) (explaining how campaign contribution limits implicate First Amendment).
166.
167.

See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
See Baker, supra note 11, at 695-96; see also Alstott, supra note 164, at 20-25

(considering problems that ensuring material equality for children might entail).
168.
169.
Marriage
170.
held that

See, e.g., Kessler, supranote 10, at 53-58.
[2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 522 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub. noma. Alliance for
& Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
The classic example is McGuire v. MeGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953), which
public policy requires courts to refrain from determining "[tihe living standards of a

family."
171. Marquardt, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, supra note 17, at A 16; see also THE REVOLUTION
tN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 31.
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willingness to use children as pawns often seen upon the dissolution of
traditional marriages arise with equal regularity upon the dissolution of
same-sex and other nontraditional relationships. At dissolution, legal or
biological parents often have attempted to dispute the non-biological
parent's legal claim to a relationship with the child-notwithstanding
earlier co-parenting agreements, second-parent adoptions, or freely
chosen divisions of familial labor. 7 2 Departures from traditional norms
do not obviate the sorts of controversies that often arise at divorce. As
such
the parental community expands, moreover, the possibilities for 74
73
acknowledge.'
explicitly
supporters
that
point
a
disputes increase,1
As shown earlier, contemporary family law has created a structure
that distinguishes among the three primary layers of the "parenthood
pie"-physical custody, legal custody, and financial responsibility-to
be divided and subdivided at family dissolution.' 75 At a conceptual level,
slices of physical custody and financial responsibility readily lend
themselves to allocation among two or more parents because these
incidents of parentage entail, respectively, time and money-both
divisible commodities. 76 The routine accommodation in a divorce
decree of, for example, grandparent visitation and college tuition from a
nonparental source (the state or a scholarship), shows just how easily
family law can look beyond the traditional bi-parentage model when
time and money constitute the issues.

172. See, e.g., Adoption of Joshua S., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 776, 777 (Ct. App. 2005) (a later
companion proceeding to Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 558 (Cal. 2003), in which the
California Supreme Court first recognized second-parent adoption), review granted,op. superseded
& aff'd, 174 P.3d 192, 194 (Cal. 2005); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d 103, 103 (Ga. 2007)
(Carley, J., dissenting); A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Mass. 2006); T.B. v. L.R.M., 2005
PA Super. 114, 2, 874 A.2d 34, 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d
3-5, 912 A.2d 951,
741, 744-45 (Tex. App. 2007); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78,
956; Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 824 (Va. 2008).
173. See, e.g., Emily Buss, "Parental"Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 668-82 (2002).
174. For example, Professor Baker describes:
The more people with claims to a child, the more courts have to make decisions with
regard to what is in a child's best interest .... Whenever legal parents are separated, the
court is responsible for resolving children-rearing disputes between them.
... The more adults debate and clash over how to raise a child the less coherent the
child's way of life.
Baker, supra note 11, at 675, 683; see also id. at 708 (noting that custody litigation is bad for
children).
175. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
176. See Marygold S. Melli & Patricia Brown, Exploring a New Family Form-The Shared
Time Family,22 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 231, 232-33 (2008).
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Although the statute spelling out the elements of a parenting plan,
quoted earlier, 7 7 also shows how legal custody, or parental

decisionmaking, can be divided (with, say, the child's medical care
entrusted to one parent and education to another), allocating this
particular incident presents greater challenges. First, the prospect of a
group of adults, perhaps feeling post-dissolution antagonism,
collectively trying to decide how to rear a child justifiably sets off
alarms, among multi-parentage's supporters and detractors alike.178 And
group decisionmaking would logically follow from the current
prominence in family law of joint legal custody, 179 which generally
entails in the bi-parentage case jointly exercised or shared
80
decisionmaking, not segmented or alternating decisionmaking.'
Second, despite some limits,' 8' decisionmaking authority emerges as a
logically prior and more robust prerogative than either physical custody
or financial responsibility because the United States Supreme Court has
treated choices
about visitation
matters' 82 and childrearing
expenditures 18 as critical aspects of parental autonomy, which the
Constitution presumptively protects.
Third, decisionmaking authority encompasses far more than, say,
with whom the child visits or what type of school the child will attend.
Even in many of its mundane components, childrearing constitutes an
expressive activity, entailing choices that reflect one's values, style, and

177. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
178. See Marquardt, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, supra note 17, at A 16; see also supranote 174
and quoted source.
179. See Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood. EncouragingDivorced Fathers
to Parent,153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 985-90 (2005).
180. Cf, e.g., In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1214, 1218-19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006)
(finding no abuse of discretion in a court order giving the father authority over decisions regarding
medical care and religion).
181. For example, except in rare circumstances presenting a risk of harm to the child, a parent
granted sole legal custody cannot deprive another parent of all visitation, which courts have
interpreted as a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See sources cited supra note 45.
182. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000) (plurality opinion). The Court held
unconstitutional, as applied, a state statute permitting courts at any time and under any
circumstances to compel third-party visitation with a child, even over a fit parent's objection. In
Troxel, which arose outside the divorce context, the mother would have permitted her daughters to
visit with their deceased father's parents, but the grandparents sued, seeking an order for even more
time with the children. Id. at 60-61.
183. For example, two of the leading cases recognizing a constitutional right to parental
autonomy concerned educational expenditures. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400
(1923) (instruction in the German language); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (private schooling).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/2

32

Appleton: Parents by the Numbers
2008]

PARENTS BY THE NUMBERS

priorities and, in turn, creates a unique family culture. 184 The respect for
pluralism that purports to undergird contemporary family law
emphasizes such uniqueness. 185 Upon family dissolution, shared
decisionmaking might offer the child the benefits of pluralism or
"double exposure"'186 but also might pose risks of confusion and
instability, 187 in addition to the conflict and impasse that hostile parents
might create. As Marquardt quite vividly has contended in an analysis of
the feelings of children after divorce, they often live "between two
worlds,"' 8 8 not just physically but also in terms of family culture. Thus,
although classified as a distinct incident of parentage, decisionmaking
(or "parental autonomy" in the constitutional vernacular) necessarily
permeates the other incidents as well.
Consistent with such observations, psychoanalysts-child advocates
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit once famously argued that all authority
should be vested in a single custodial parent after family dissolution, for
the sake of the child, who needs to feel complete confidence and security
in the adult in charge, free from second-guessing by a court or others;
thus, they contended that one adult, the true psychological parent, should
exercise all post-dissolution decisionmaking authority, with the power to
exclude altogether even another parent from any visitation.
The
rationale underlying the approach of Goldstein and his co-authors does
not dispute that maintaining a relationship with another parent after
family dissolution has value for the child; rather, the argument goes,
court-ordered visitation or other external constraints on the custodial
184. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1371 (1994) ("For parents and other guardians, civil freedom brings a right to
choose and propagate values."); David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the
Constitution:A JurisprudentialPerspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1980) ("Child-rearing is one
of the ways in which many people fulfill and express their deepest values about how life is to be
lived. To this extent, one's children are the test of one's life and aspirations."); Merry Jean Chan,
Note, The Authorial Parent:An IntellectualProperty Model of ParentalRights, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1186, 1187 (2003) (proposing "intellectual property model" that would "[anchor] parental rights in
the First Amendment"). Laura Kessler pushes the point further, contending that caregiving can "be a
form of political resistance or expression." Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving,33 FLA. ST.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
185. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV.
955, 956 (1993); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,ParentalPreference,and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 615, 617-18, 658 (1992).
186. See Rosenbury, supra note 79, at 891 (advancing a theory that would promote "pluralism
within the family as well as without").
187. See, e.g., Eickbush v. Eickbush, 2007 WY 179, 11, 171 P.3d 509, 512 (Wyo. 2007).
188. See generally ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, BETWEEN Two WORLDS: THE INNER LIVES OF
CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (2005) (discussing the difficulty that children of divorce experience because
of their parents' different styles, different views, and different residences).
189.

GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 85, at 38.
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parent's childrearing discretion impose too great a cost on the child's
wellbeing, which depends directly on the psychological parent's
autonomy.19 °
Extremely controversial even when it first emerged during an era in
which sole custody was the rule of the day,' 9' the approach advanced by
Goldstein and his co-authors has been all but buried as the fathers' rights
movement gained momentum and joint legal custody became standard
fare in most family courts. 192 Today, some states employ a presumption
of joint legal custody, others express a preference for it, and parental
agreement no longer constitutes a prerequisite. 193 Some authorities favor
joint legal custody over joint physical custody as the means of involving
more than one parent in a child's post-dissolution life, perhaps because
joint legal custody appears to pose fewer practical problems 94 or
perhaps because this arrangement seems fairer to one who is paying
child support. Consistent with this favored treatment of joint legal
custody, the ALI's Principles direct a court to "presume that an
allocation of decisionmaking responsibility jointly to each legal parent
or parent by estoppel who has been exercising a reasonable share of
parenting functions is in the child's best interests." 195 By contrast, the
Principles' favored resolution of physical custody disputes, in the
absence of parental agreement, is not joint custody but an
"approximation" approach under which a parent's custodial
responsibility for a child approximates the
time the parent spent with the
96
child while the family remained intact. 1
190. Id.; see, e.g., Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes:
From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REv. 395, 401-03 (2000) (explaining theory developed by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit).
191. For critiques, see, for example, Nanette Dembitz, Beyond Any Discipline's Competence,
83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1310-11 (1974) (reviewing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973)) and Peter L. Strauss & Joanna B.

Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 996, 1001-03 (1974).
192. See, e.g., DWYER, supra note 7, at 43; Marygold S.Melli, The American Law Institute
Principles of Family Dissolution, the Approximation Rule and Shared-Parenting,25 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 347, 352-53 (2005); see also Leslie Eaton, Lawyer Who Fought Pledge Assails Courts on
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at B2. One authority states that a significant minority of states
currently contain a preference for joint physical and/or legal custody. Dwyer, supra note 138, at
911.
193. See, e.g., Schepard, supra note 190, at 406-07 (recounting history of "joint custody
revolution"). But see, e.g., Eickbush v. Eickbush, 207 WY 179, 11, 171 P.3d 509, 512 (Wyo.
2007) (noting that Wyoming disfavors joint custody absent good reason therefor).
194. See DWYER, supra note 7, at 228; Maldonado, supra note 179, at 985-88.
195.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 2.09(2) (2002); see Melli, supra note 192, at 349.
196. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.08(1). Approximating past
allocations of authority promotes pluralism and private ordering by using, in the absence of present
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Given the present state of the law, then, the advent of multiparentage provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at the special
challenges of shared decisionmaking. In the current environment, some
courts have been willing to push joint legal custody ever farther by
ordering decisionmaking to be shared among two parents and others
such as grandparents. 197 Some authorities, however, exhibit hesitation
about increasing the number of individuals sharing childrearing
decisions. For example, just two of the three parents recognized in Jacob
v. Shultz-Jacob received legal custody, with Frampton allocated only
physical custody and child support duties. 198 Although the Principles'
presumption in favor of joint decisionmaking responsibility for legal
parents and parents by estoppel might be read to include more than two
adults, 199 the black-letter language about the allocation that the court
should make refers expressly to "one parent or to two parents jointly. 20 0
Further, the presumption for joint decisionmaking responsibility does
not include de facto parents (thus again denigrating caretaking compared
to providing financial support). 20 1 Finally, the Principlescaution that the
court "should limit or deny an allocation [of responsibility to a legal
parent, a parent by estoppel, or a de facto parent] otherwise to be made
if, in light of the number of other individuals to be allocated
responsibility, the allocation would be impractical. 2 °2
I would venture that such hesitation about expansion signals the
need for a deeper investigation of shared decisionmaking itself. True, the
greater the number of parents the more the likelihood that one will
disagree. But how many is too many? On what basis do we take for
granted that two will work or that three will not? If the single, fully
autonomous parent advocated by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
represented too extreme a position, does the new norm of fully shared
post-dissolution decisionmaking reveal a pendulum that has swung too
agreement, the way the family members themselves sought to structure their responsibilities at a
time when they were able to collaborate. It also promotes a child's interests if we assume that adults
involved in his or her life know more about what's best in the individual case than does the state.
See Scott, supra note 185, at 617 (first formulating "an 'approximation' rule").
197. See, e.g., In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564 (N.H. 2005) (upholding statute that would allow joint
legal custody to parents and grandparent and remanding for consideration of additional facts in this
case).

198. 2007 PA Super. 118, 21-24, 923 A.2d 473, 481-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
199. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.09(2).
200. Id. § 2.09(1).
201. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Although they do not benefit from the
presumption, "[a] de facto parent may be allocated decisionmaking responsibility." PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.09 cmt. a.
202. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.18(l)(b) (emphasis added).
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far in the other direction? 20 3 The prospect of multi-parentage, by
magnifying the problems of joint legal custody, calls attention to them
even in the more traditional bi-parentage scenario, reinvigorating a
conversation left unfinished in lawmakers' rush to embrace joint
custody.20 4 Although I predict that the attraction of shared physical
custody is unlikely to lose its luster soon,20 5 deeper exploration of a host
of issues remains overdue, including what shared decisionmaking entails
in practice, how it plays out for children, and whether a child can
maintain a meaningful relationship with more than one parent206 even
when only one controls childrearing decisions. The debate about multiparentage underscores the importance of pursuing such issues.
D. ParentageJurisdiction
Multi-parentage also poses challenges to current jurisdictional
doctrines and calls attention to the need for additional development of
the law even for cases involving only two parents. The preference for
custody adjudications in the child's home state, first advanced in the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA")20 7 (and later
included, with some changes, in the Federal Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act ("PKPA") 20 8) reflects the understanding of such
adjudications as intensely fact-specific assessments in which evidence
about the child's day-to-day interactions and the availability of witnesses
with knowledge of the child and his or her environment carry significant

203. Cf Baker, supra note 11, at 709-10 (discussing the difficulties of compelled involvement
of a second parent and the shift from sole custody to equally shared parenting and now back to more
limited rights for non-custodial parents).
204. See Dwyer, supra note 138, at 911 (reporting a "retreat" from joint custody presumptions
in some states, without distinguishing legal and physical custody).
205. Indeed, today fathers' rights activists have been seeking to establish a constitutional right
to a strictly equal division of the child's time, as well as shared decisionmaking authority. See, e.g.,
Margaret F. Brinig, Does ParentalAutonomy Require Joint Custody at Divorce?, 65 LA. L. REV.
1345 (2005); David D. Meyer, The ConstitutionalRights of Non-Custodial Parents,34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1461, 1473-74 (2006); see also Melli & Brown, supra note 176, at 233 (examining the rise of
"post divorce shared time custody arrangements"). But see Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in
Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 781-86 (2006) (tracking
recent movement away from joint physical custody arrangements) [hereinafter Brinig, Penalty
Defaults].
206. Advocates of shared parenting claim that it keeps a second parent, usually a father,
involved in the child's life, in turn providing both financial and emotional benefits to the child. See,
e.g., Maldonado, supra note 179, at 984-85.
207. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. I a, at 307-08 (1999).
208. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(a) (2000).
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weight. 20 9 Hence, the drafters expressly incorporated a preference for a
forum with "maximum rather than minimum contact '2 10 with the child.
Similarly, the prospect of custody modification, upon a showing of
changed circumstances, sparked special rules in the UCCJA 2 11 and
PKPA 2 12 designed to eliminate forum shopping and jurisdictional

competition.
Although the UCCJA and PKPA were drafted with custody

adjudications in mind, some courts relied on their approach in contested
adoption proceedings.21 3 The attention sparked by the "Baby Jessica
case ' 214 and some other high-profile controversies that similarly raised
jurisdictional issues in the context of the relinquishment or other
215
terminations of the birth parents' rights, prior to adoption of the child,
inspired the development of new rules. The UCCJA's successor, the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, now makes
clear that adoption is not governed by such custody jurisdiction
statutes 2 16 with their special emphasis on the child's situation and on the
prospect of modification.
Instead, the Uniform Adoption Act ("UAA") governs adoption
217
matters.
The UAA situates adoption jurisdiction in several possible
states: where the child has lived, where the prospective adopter has
lived, or where the agency is located.2 18 Once a proceeding has
commenced, the forum's jurisdiction continues. 219 The jurisdictional
principle at work in the UAA reflects that adoption is a once-and-for-all
decree, not a ruling subject to modification upon a showing of changed

209. See UNiF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § l(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 271 (stating
legislative purpose to "assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily
in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where significant
evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily
available").
210. Id.§ 3 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 309.
211. Id. prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 263; id. §§ 13-15, 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 559-625.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d), (f), (h).
213. E.g., People ex rel. A.J.C., 88 P.3d 599, 605 (Colo. 2004); Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So.
2d 690, 704-05 (Miss. 2003); Adoption of H.L.C., 706 N.W.2d 90, 93 (S.D. 2005); see also
Adoption of Asente, 734 N.E.2d 1224, 1231 (Ohio 2000) (stating that a majority of jurisdictions
apply the UCCJA and PKPA to adoptions).
214. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
215. E.g., In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1034 (D.C. App. 1989).
216.

UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 103, 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 660

(1997).
217. See id. § 103 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 660-61; Herna Hill Kay, Adoption in the Conflict of
Laws: The UAA, Not the UCCJA, Is the Answer, 84 CAL. L. REV. 703, 744-46 (1996).
218. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-101(a), 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 67 (1999).
219. Id. § 3-101(b), 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 67-68.
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circumstances, like child custody. 220 This approach also reflects the
assumption that a ruling as to who is a child's parent (the result of an
adoption decree) does not require the same fact-intensive evaluation
necessary to decide between competing individuals conceded to be
parents which one should have custody.22' In other words, the different
jurisdictional approaches are designed to reflect the distinctive questions
posed in custody and adoption cases, respectively.
This two-track approach to jurisdiction fails to reflect the
contemporary emphasis on functional parentage, however. A court
having personal jurisdiction over the adults with interests at stake 222 can
223
determine parentage once and for all based on adoption, a DNA test,

marital status, or even the act of giving birth,224 regardless of the child's
home state. By contrast, a parentage determination based on functional
criteria would seem to require the same "maximum contact" 225 necessary
to adjudicate custody between competing parents. Indeed, in several
jurisdictions, application of a traditional formal rule, the presumption of
legitimacy, now often depends on the best interests of the child.226
The well-publicized interstate dispute between Lisa Miller-Jenkins
and Janet Miller-Jenkins after the breakup of their union highlights the
distinction between-but frequent entanglement of-parentage and
custody determinations.22 7 The Vermont Supreme Court applied custody
220. But see People ex rel. A.J.C., 88 P.3d 599, 603-04 (Colo. 2004) (deciding custody based

on best interests after a failed adoption); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT
ACT § 103 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt.la, at 661 (explaining that courts must address custody after denying
an adoption).
221. Naomi Calm has recognized how these issues often become intertwined on the merits.
Naomi R. Cahn, RefrainingChild Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 58 (1997).

222. Is in personam jurisdiction required for custody? The issue awaits definitive resolution.
See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-35 (1953); id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66

MINN. L. REV. 711, 735-64 (1982). On the other hand, child support orders require in personam
jurisdiction. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 86 (1978). To the extent that an adjudication of
parentage imposes financial obligations or deprives one claiming parentage of an asserted liberty
interest, then a court deciding parentage must have in personam jurisdiction.
223. For example, in some jurisdictions, genetic criteria determine parentage in gestational
surrogacy arrangements. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (using genetics and
intent to resolve dispute); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass.

2001). Further, there is authority for distinguishing paternity cases from custody cases for
jurisdictional purposes. See, e.g., Harshberger v. Harshberger, 724 N.W.2d 148, 156 (N.D. 2006);
cf Huss v. Huss, 888 N.E.2d 1238, 1241-43 (Ind. 2008).
224. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(l), 9B U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 2008).
225. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.

226. See Appleton, supra note 24, at 234-35 n.35 (noting that twelve states make the
presumption rebuttable in child's best interests).
227. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78
v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 824-25 (Va. 2008).

7-9, 912 A.2d 951, 957; Miller-Jenkins
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jurisdiction statutes, the UCCJA and the PKPA, treating the case as a
custody and visitation dispute, 228 even though one fundamental point of
contention concerned whether Janet was a parent at all to Isabella, who
was conceived by donor insemination and born to Lisa during the
women's civil union. Despite her petition conceding Janet's
parentage,2 29 in the later proceedings Lisa argued that she was Isabella's
sole parent. In other words, Lisa contended that Janet was a mere third
party or legal stranger. 230 And traditionally the law has regarded such
third parties as unprotected outsiders whom parents can exclude from a
2 31
child's life.
In this case, Janet's claimed parentage might rest on an automatic
rule of parentage, specifically Vermont's gender-neutral version of the
traditional presumption of legitimacy, which makes the mother's partner
the child's second parent 23 2-- one consequence of an approach that gives
same-sex couples in civil unions all the same rights, responsibilities, and
benefits accorded to married couples.233 Alternatively, Janet's status
might rest on functional criteria, including several factors mentioned by
the court: the parties' expectations and intent, Janet's active participation
in both prenatal care and Isabella's birth, and Janet's performance of a
parental role as well as Lisa's explicit treatment of her as a parent.234
Although the Vermont court considered these matters, it maintained its
focus on the issue of custody jurisdiction. 235 Later, when a Virginia court
of appeals decided to respect the Vermont decisions,236 it described its

228.

Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT

9, 912 A.2d at 957 ("This case is, at base, an interstate

jurisdictional dispute over visitation with a child.").
229. Id. 4, 912 A.2d at 956. For one possible explanation for this concession and its context,
see April Witt, About Isabella, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2007, at W14 (reporting disagreement between
attorney and client).
230. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 7 41-42, 912 A.2d at 965-66; Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
637 S.E.2d 330, 335-36 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
231. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 311-12; see supranotes 49-51 and accompanying text.
232. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2007). See Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 43, 912 A.2d at
966.
233. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
234. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 56, 912 A.2d at 970.
235. Id. 9, 912 A.2d at 957.
236. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). Virginia law,
however, explicitly rejects recognition of any unions other than male-female marriages under its
Marriage Affirmation Law. See id. at 337; Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 825-27
(Va. 2008) (applying the "law of the case" doctrine to Lisa's challenge to the Vermont decision in
Virginia again).
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action as a remand of the case "with instruction to grant full faith
and
237
credit to the custody and visitation ordersof the Vermont court."
To be sure, Lisa's petition, filed in Vermont, seeking to dissolve the
civil union, listing Isabella as a child of the union, and requesting
custody for herself and visitation for Janet, 238 conflated the issues of
parentage, on the one hand, and custody and visitation, on the other. And
certainly judicial economy provides a good reason for resolving related
issues in the same court. Although related, however, the issues call for
different jurisdictional analyses, and rules of "automatic parentage"
versus functional tests for parentage only add to the existing disarray.
Thus, the prospect of multi-parentage highlights the need for a
closer look at the different jurisdictional strands that govern parentage,
on the one hand, and custody, on the other 239 -- strands that now have
become entangled even in bi-parentage cases like Miller-Jenkins.24 °
Where might such efforts to disentangle these strands go? Family law
long has used an approach that fragments jurisdiction depending on the
precise issue to be decided, specifically the doctrine of divisible
divorce. 24 1 Thus, perhaps parentage cases should be separated, with

237. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332 (emphasis added). I believe that the Virginia court
correctly decided that the Vermont rulings should evoke full faith and credit. In fact, I believe that
the Vermont court had proper jurisdiction over the parentage issues-but not necessarily because of
the UCCJA or PKPA.
238. Miller-Jenkins,2006 VT 3-5,912 A.2d at 956.
239. Cf Cahn, supra note 221, at 3 (clarifying that custody decisionmaking requires a two-step
process: "the first step is defining and identifying the parent(s), and the second step is determining
the child's best interests").
240. The excessively publicized litigation following Anna Nicole Smith's death provides a
second illustration of my point. See, e.g., Barry Wigmore, Ex-Lover of Anna Nicole Is Her Little
Girl's
Father, DAILY
MAIL
(London), Apr.
11,
2007,
available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-447792/Larry-Brikhead-revealed-father-Anna-NicoleSmith-daughter.html. Both parentage and custody of baby Dannielynn were initially contested.
Several men-Howard K. Stem, Larry Birkhead, and Prince Frederick Von Anhalt-all claimed to
be the baby's father. See id If the issue were to be determined exclusively on the basis of genetic
evidence, then any court to which the interested adults might submit should have authority to
resolve the issue, once and for all. On the other hand, if functional criteria were to play a role in
determining which man is Dannielynn's father, as suggested by some of Stem's initial claims, then
only a court in the Bahamas, where the child had been bom and spent her young life-her home
state-arguably should have authority to decide. Moreover, it remains an open question whether a
court in the home state must have personal jurisdiction in order to divest a competing adult of
parental rights. See supra note 222. For example, assuming U.S. principles apply, could the
Bahamas recognize Stem at Birkhead's expense without personal jurisdiction over Birkhead?
Finally, the public debate about the litigation assumed a two-parent regime so that, in addition to her
deceased mother, Dannielynn could have only one father.
241. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948). This doctrine situates jurisdiction over
dissolution of marriage and its consequences in different locations. Dissolution of marriage must
take place at a spouse's domicile. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945); Williams
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cases based on functional criteria subject to different jurisdictional rules
than other cases. Alternatively, perhaps these jurisdictional problems
invite a deeper exploration of family law's reliance on parental status as
a construct-separate and apart from the incidents of physical custody,
decisionmaking authority, and financial obligation. The following
section includes the beginning of such exploration, raising questions in
the larger context of the aspirations discernible in modern family law.
IV.

ASPIRATIONAL FAMILY LAW, PARENTAL NUMBERS,
AND PARENTAL STATUS

In recent years, family law has often confronted a clash between its
aspirations, on the one hand, and on-the-ground realities and behavior
patterns, on the other.242 The aspirations often prevail. For example, in
the famous custody case of Palmore v. Sidoti,243 the Fourteenth

Amendment's anti-discrimination goals trumped "the reality of private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict ' 244 on a Caucasian child
living with her mother, who began cohabiting with and later married an
African-American man. Conceding that the "effects of racial prejudice"
might well be "real, 2 45 the Court ruled impermissible these otherwise
plausible considerations under the best interests standard for child
custody and overturned the decision below changing custody from the
mother to the father. Additional examples of family law's embrace of its
aspirations, even in the face of problematic evidence, appear in the
judicial validation of prenuptial agreements treating prospective
husbands and wives as if they have equal bargaining power,246 the
scholarly critique of divorce reforms addressing the different roles of
men and women in marriage, 247 and Congress's decision in the Family
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302-04 (1942). Only a court with personal jurisdiction over both
spouses can resolve the financial consequences of dissolution including child support. E.g., Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418-19 (1957).
And, as noted, a court closely connected to the child-preferably in the child's "home state"decides child custody. See supranotes 207-12 and accompanying text.
242. Others have recognized this aspirational feature of family law. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J.
2525, 2526 (1994).
243. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
244. Id. at 433.
245. Id. at 434.
246. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (enforcing premarital
agreements to demonstrate equal status of men and women).
247. See, e.g., June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply
to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1463, 1485 (1990) (criticizing approach to post-divorce support
that reinforces gendered specialization in marriage).
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and Medical Leave Act to adopt a gender-neutral leave law while
conceding the gendered realities of family caregiving.248
Family law's aspirations not only depict a world that ought to exist.
Such aspirations also animate a wide range of laws and policies
unabashedly designed to shape choices and influence behavior-to help
achieve this better world. The literature on family law's "channeling
function" 249 discloses that the field has a teleology. Illustrations abound,
including the benefits triggered by marriage (designed to encourage
marriage), 250 abortion-funding restrictions (designed to discourage
abortion), 25' and family caps (designed to deter procreation by recipients
of public assistance). 2 Meanwhile, scholars propose new state action to
steer family conduct, such as the surnames spouses use. 253 Of course,
sharp disagreements about the features of the world that ought to exist
and the desired ends of this teleology help explain family law's place at
the epicenter of the so-called culture wars. The following subparts
consider some implications of multi-parentage for this "aspirational
family law."
A.

The Promise of TransgressingGender

One argument supporting legally recognized multi-parentage claims
that it will unsettle gender categories and the longstanding privilege
enjoyed by heterosexuality. Specifically, Kessler writes that that
254
collaborative childrearing practiced by some gays and lesbians
illustrate how "disconnecting family formation and reproduction from
heterosexual relations[] ... reveal[s] heterosexuality and biology to be

248. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(a)(5), 2601(b)(4)-(5) (2000).
249. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
495 (1992); see also Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the
Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2133 (2007).

250. E.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (N.Y. 2006) (describing benefits provided to
married couples under New York law, designed to encourage heterosexual sex to take place within
marriage).
251.

E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (funding scheme "encouraging childbirth

except in the most urgent circumstances[] is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
objective of protecting potential life").
252. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms Promote Abortion: "Personal
Responsibility, " "Family Values, " and the Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155, 159 (1996).
253. See generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the

Future of MaritalNames, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (2007) (arguing for reform of the law of marital
names to encourage more egalitarian decisions).
254. For more details on such practices, see generally, for example, DIANE EHRENSAFT,
MOMMIES, DADDIES, DONORS, SURROGATES: ANSWERING TOUGH QUESTIONS AND BUILDING
STRONG FAMILIES (2005).
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mere symbols of a privileged relationship." 255 Kessler's notion builds on
the vision of "transgressive caregiving" that she has explored
elsewhere,256 and she sees the opportunity for official recognition of
multi-parentage as a "potentially transformative moment" that legal
feminists should seize.25 7
At the risk of oversimplifying, I see this same challenge to gender
norms at the root of the opposing view as well. In situating the
disapproval of multi-parentage in a larger argument against same-sex
marriage, against "[s]lippage in the [m]eaning of [f]atherhood and
[m]otherhood[,] 258 and against procreation other than by heterosexual
marital intercourse, opponents make threats to traditional gender
classifications a recurring theme. 259 Thus, different views of the
significance of gender reveal contrasting visions about the aspirations
that family law should now pursue.
Given these two positions, I normatively side with Kessler;
however, I find recent developments far more complicated and equivocal
than her optimistic vision suggests. Specifically, in the illustrations of
multi-parentage that Kessler describes from the gay and lesbian
community, often the "additional" legal parent is one who brings a
"missing gender" to the family. 260 I see as no coincidence the court's
recognition of parental status for the sperm donor in Jacob v. ShultzJacob26 1 because, without such recognition, the children would have two
mothers but no father. A.A. v. B.B.,262 although a bit different, reaches
the same bottom line, because the court and the parties conceded that
second-parent adoption would have given the second mother the desired
legal status, albeit with termination of the genetic father's parental
rights. So, here too, one can see the genetic father as the "additional"
255.

Kessler, supra note 10, at 73.

256. Kessler, supra note 184.
257.
258.

Kessler, supra note 10, at 77.
THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 22.

259. See, e.g., id at 14. See generally THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW, supra note 41
(condemning the movement of family law away from the view of marriage as a sexual union
between husband and wife); cf Tara Parker-Pope, Gay Unions Shed Light on Gender in Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at Fl (reporting findings that, compared to heterosexual couples, samesex couples have more egalitarian and satisfying relationships).
260. See Dowd, Multiple Parents, supra note 13, at 244 (discussing Fiona Kelly, who has
made the same observation); cf In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 919 (Tex. App. 2005) (concluding
that a sperm donor has legal standing to seek adjudication of his paternity); Cynthia R. Mabry, Who
Is the Baby's Daddy (And Why Is It Important for the Child to Know)?, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 211
(2004) (addressing the importance to children's identity of their relationship with their father).
261. 2007 PA 118, 24-25, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
262. [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 525 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub nom. Alliance for
Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
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parent and the legal procedure necessary to include him as the
innovative step. Indeed, such families themselves seem to share the
assumptions that I attribute here to the courts. 63
Of course, one familiar argument against same-sex marriage
contends that children need a mother and a father.2 64 But to what extent
do we find such gendered notions at work even as parental numbers
expand? Consider, for example, whether the court in Shultz-Jacob would
have been equally willing to add a third mother to the official list of
parents. Similar thought exercises help illuminate the ongoing resistance
to the recognition of multiple fathers in cases in which the genetic father
of a married woman's child is someone other than her husband 265 and
concerns expressed following the raid on the Texas polygamists'
compound about the children's inability to identify their "own" mothers
from among the several women they regarded as such.266
Indeed, even among the supporters of multi-parentage, some of the
individuals who are candidates for inclusion in the parental community
are genetic or biological parents who might or might not be fully
contributing to childrearing.267 Contrary to Kessler's expectations, then,
might multi-parentage offer a new opportunity for family law to
reinscribe the continuing importance of gender and bionormativity, even
in this era of nontraditional families?
To the extent that supporters see in the recognition of multiple
parents a means of unsettling the way we conventionally think about
families and the significance of gender in families, then a critical
question becomes the perceptions that multi-parentage creates. A story
recounted by Diane Ehrensaft, a psychologist who works with families
headed by gays and lesbians in California, offers one answer that

263. See John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 19, 2006, at 66.
264. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, What Marriage Is For, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO &
CON: A READER 263, 269 (Andrew Sullivan ed., rev. ed. 2004) (condemning "unisex marriage," a
concept suggesting that "law was neutral as to whether children had mothers and fathers").
265. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting
dual fatherhood); Sinicropi v. Mazurek, 729 N.W.2d 256, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting two
fathers for child with a mother) aff'd by No. 281726, 2008 WL 2596217 (Mich. Ct. App. July 1,
2008). But see J.R. v. L.R., 902 A.2d 261, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (dividing support
obligation between mother's husband, who reared child, and biological father).
266. See, e.g., Amy Joi O'Donoghue & Nancy Perkins, FLDS Court Showdown Begins,
DESERET MORNING NEWS, Apr. 18, 2008, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
miqn4188/is_20080418/ain25352433 (noting that "FLDS children 'don't think that way' [and]
describe having a father of the house and several mothers").
267. See EHRENSAFT, supra note 254, at 197-99; Bowe, supra note 263, at 68, 70; see also
Baker, supra note 11, at 685-91; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 335-38. But see, e.g., THE REVOLUTION IN
PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 32.
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highlights the complex and contextual nature of such possible
perceptions.268 Ehrensaft has reported the experience of a lesbian couple
who along with their child and the man who provided the semen (and
who, with the women, was participating in the child's upbringing) were
anxiously traveling together through Utah, a state with a conservative
reputation where they feared that their nontraditional family would
encounter hostility or worse. To their surprise, they were treated as
welcome visitors as they stopped at roadside restaurants along their
route. They then realized that residents of Utah were accustomed to
seeing families that looked like theirs-polygamous families.
What message should one take away from this story? Opponents of
multi-parentage might find validation for their rhetorical habit of linking
same-sex marriage, polygamy, and now multi-parentage. 269 Further,
polygamy is often associated with heterosexuality and gender
oppression,2 70 values quite inconsistent with a fully realized version of
Kessler's transgressive agenda.27' On the other hand, the fact that some
might see polygamy as a positive option for feminists, given the
relationship that the "sister wives" share,2 72 simply underscores the
uncertainty and contingency of the inquiry.
Additional complexities and possible contradictions emerge from
placing Kessler's agenda in a wider frame that includes our
understandings and practices of caregiving, which remain saturated with
gender and thus have become an object of law reform supported by
many feminists. Consider, for example, the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 273 adopted in part to facilitate family caregiving and to relieve some
working parents from the necessity of choosing between their jobs and

268. Ehrensaft told this story during a lecture entitled "Psychological and Legal Aspects of
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) and Adoption in GLBT Families," on May 19, 2007, in
St. Louis, Mo. See also EHRENSAFT, supra note 254, at 10-11, 147-48.
269.

E.g., THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supranote 7, at 28-31.

270. See also Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searchingfor Gender Talk in the
Same-Sex MarriageDebate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 129 (2005).
271. In Transgressive Caregiving,Kessler describes her thesis as "partial," and she notes that
the caregiving practices she examines will not "always necessarily serve to disrupt oppressive
majoritarian norms." Kessler, supranote 184, at 4, 9.
272. Some descriptions present modem polygamy as a feminist option that helps women "have
it all" and frees them to spend time with other women ("sister wives") instead of having a domestic
relationship exclusively with a husband. See, e.g., Elizabeth Joseph, My Husband's Nine Wives,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A31; see also Emens, supranote 2, at 314-17; cf Shayna M. Sigman,
Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (2006)
(urging decriminalization); Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy:
Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439, 440 (2003) (examining "postmodem polygamy").
273. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 etseq. (2000).
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certain domestic obligations.2 74 As the United States Supreme Court has
emphasized in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,275 the
statute also has a significant aspirational component. It was designed
both to combat gender stereotypes and to degender carework.276
Such goals, even if they fail to go far enough, 277 should-like
Kessler's vision-appeal to legal feminists.278 Yet, whether multiparentage will advance the degendering of carework remains unclear.
Based on the probable gender of those who provide care for children
when their parents work outside the home, one might plausibly worry
that expanded rules of parentage could undermine this purpose by

274. Id. § 2601(b) (enacted with a stated purpose of"balanc[ing] the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families").
275. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
276. The majority explained in this case:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to
regard the family as the woman's domain, they often denied men similar
accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to
continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers'
stereotypical views about women's commitment to work and their value as employees.
By creating an across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible
employees, Congress sought to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be
stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female employees, and
that employers could not evade leave obligations simply by hiring men. By setting a
minimum standard of family leave for alleligible employees, irrespective of gender, the
FMLA attacks the formerly state-sanctioned stereotype that only women are responsible
for family caregiving, thereby reducing employers' incentives to engage in
discrimination by basing hiring and promotion decisions on stereotypes.
Id. at 736-37; see also, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New
Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006). One might
conceptualize the goal here, to use David Cruz's terminology, as "disestablishing sex and gender."
David B. Cruz, DisestablishingSex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1009 (2002).
277. For example, one criticism is that such reforms do not reach gendered conduct within the
family itself. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 163, at 164 ("The practice of gender equality exists
only to the extent that individual married couples chose to embrace it, unsupervised by the state.").
278. Even when performances depart from traditional norms and expectations, Kessler does
not necessarily find them "transgressive," despite suggestions in Transgressive Caregiving. Kessler,
supra note 184. For example, she finds some cases recognizing two legal mothers "stuck" in a
traditional allocation of gender roles-because one mother served as breadwinner and the other as
homemaker. See Kessler, supra note 10, at 70-71 n.148 (commenting on K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d
673, 677 (Cal. 2005)) ("[T]he K.M. decision.., subtly protects the two-parent norm by treating a
same-sex couple like a heterosexual couple where the parties conform in significant part to
heterosexual gender roles." (emphasis added)). Arguably, any conjugal couple, regardless of
gender, evokes the marital model and its patriarchal underpinnings. On the other hand, from a
child's perspective, doesn't life with a mother-breadwinner drain traditional gender stereotypes and
patterns of some of their power?
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putting more pressure on mothers to find others (women)
to join the
279
parenting enterprise rather than inducing fathers to pitch in.
From this vantage point, then, a practice that Kessler notes with
approval, "othermothering" in African-American communities, 280 looks
problematic and raises questions about whether caregiving by fathers
would obviate the need for so much assistance from "othermothers."
Alternatively, perhaps othennothering diminishes the importance of
fathers. As these competing interpretations show, there are risks in
oversimplifying how multi-parentage might challenge traditional gender
norms and achieve some of family law's (contested) aspirations.
B.

Transformingthe Understandingof Nonparents,Parents,and
ParentalStatus Itself

The move toward expanded parental numbers comes on the
coattails of recognition that individuals not traditionally classified as
"parents" often perform parental functions, as noted earlier.28' An
important issue that follows, then, asks whether applying the label
"parents" matters or whether the issues posed by multi-parentage remain
the same as those explored in the more familiar cases and literature on
so-called "third parties" who sometimes are accorded some parental
prerogatives, such as visitation opportunities 282 or other "custodial
fragments," as Professor Emily Buss calls them.283 If the role that
parents traditionally play can be disaggregated according to the list in a
parenting plan, as shown by the illustrative statute above,2 84 the value
added by parental status itself becomes questionable.2 85 Arguably,
family law could achieve the same effect by considering past conduct,
including conduct that results in genetic parentage, to assign narrow,
specific rights and responsibilities regarding a child (along with the

279.

See Appleton, supra note 128, at 34.

280. "Othermothers are women who assist blood mothers by sharing mothering
responsibilities." Kessler, supra note 10, at 57 (emphasis added). For one classic treatment of this
practice, see generally CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN (Basic Books 1997).
281. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 79.
282. See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners:Strangers, Partners,or Parents? The
Changing Legal Landscape and the Strugglefor ParentalEquality, 23 FAM. L.Q. 23 (2006); John
DeWitt Gregory, The DetritusofTroxel, 40 FAM. L.Q. 133 (2006); Grossman, supra note 49.
283. Emily Buss, Children'sAssociationalRights?: Why Less Is More, II WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1101, 1102 (2003).

284. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
285. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Family, the Law, and the Constitution(s) (Mar. 19,
2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-l 106423 (exploring constitutional implications of

recognizing family rights without family status).
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constitutional protection appropriate to the incident in question) to
various individuals without denominating them "parents."
In my view, the name matters for several reasons even apart from
the specific rights and duties that parental status typically entails. First,
the label and the status it signifies have considerable expressive value.
Even in a universe of expanded parental numbers, some adults in a
child's life will not be his or her parents. In other words, even if
parentage is no longer necessarily comprehensive and indivisible, it
remains exclusive 2 6-in the sense that it excludes.28 7 We know from the
controversy about same-sex marriage, even in states that accord all the
benefits and responsibilities of marriage through civil unions and
domestic partnerships, a so-called "mere label" can constitute valuable
currency and implicate constitutional protections. 288 Likewise, in the
context of kinship care, relatives often choose to become a child's
guardian, rather than to pursue adoption, because they see as important
maintaining the official status of the child's "parent" regardless of who
is performing day-to-day parental functions (although, admittedly, a
multi-parentage regime could change such preferences by eliminating
what appears to be an "either/or" decision).28 9 Hence, a third parent
differs in a meaningful way from a nonparent assigned similar rights and
responsibilities.29 °
As a result, expanding the number of parents changes our
understanding of some of those "third parties," whom the traditional
regime has treated as nonparents, outsiders, or legal strangers29 1 without obliterating the nonparental status itself. More significantly,
however, our understanding of parents necessarily changes as well.
Recognizing additional parents within the existing framework
necessarily requires either more sharing (in the sense of jointly
exercising) or more subdividing of parental rights and obligations.
Accordingly, some supporters of multi-parentage suggest a hierarchy of
legally recognized parents, with some having a more significant role
than others. For example, Jacobs envisions a scheme of "relative rights
for parents," according to adults who contribute more caretaking greater

286.

See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.

287. Michael Warner has made this argument about marriage. Michael Warner, Beyond Gay
Marriage,in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 259, 260 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
288. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401-02 (Cal. 2008).
289. See, e.g., Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: Making
the Casefor "Impermanence," 34 CAP. U. L. REv, 405, 433 (2005).

290. See Baker, supra note 285.
291. See supra note 49-50 and accompanying text.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/2

48

Appleton: Parents by the Numbers
2008]

PARENTS BY THE NUMBERS

parental authority than that accorded to those who contribute less.292 The
ALI's Principlesalso reflect a hierarchal approach.2 93 Yet, in examining
such possibilities, Baker observes that "hierarchal parenthood" or
"greater and lesser parenthood[]" stands at odds with family law's
294
current preference for equality.
Although it might run counter to equality values, however, a
hierarchal approach to expanded parental numbers would help preserve
an important aspect of our traditional understanding of parentage, which
identifies those adults (usually two) who have a preeminent relationship
with a given child. 295 "[G]reater ... parenthood," to use Baker's
phrase,296 would convey at least comforting reminders of the now
familiar construct, while "lesser parenthood" (parenthood lite?) would
emerge as a new category applicable to those formerly known as "third
parties."
By contrast, a more evenhanded treatment of multiple parents
would, in fact, present a more significant departure from the status quo,
disrupting this preeminence. The results of multi-parentage could
include a diffusion of the current intensity of the legal parent-child
relationship and increased opportunities for children to experience
pluralism within the family. 297 But multiplicity by itself would not
necessarily dilute the isolation and control of children that critics of the
existing regime of parental "ownership" have lamented.298 Consider the
children growing up on the Yearning for Zion compound in Texas.299
Despite their experience of being reared by several mothers,3 °0 their
world remains closed and confining, at least from the perspective of an
outside observer.
292.

Jacobs, supra note 7, at 333.

293. See supranotes 107-08 and accompanying text.
294. Baker, supra note 11, at 708-09. But see id at 714 (seeing hierarchal approach as way to
accommodate more parents).
295. This preeminence is the gist of Clare Huntington's argument that expanded recognition of
nonparental caregivers must respect important parental rights. Clare Huntington, Parents as Hubs,
94
VA.
L.
REV.
IN
BRIEF
45
(2008),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2008/09/01/huntington.pdf.
296. Baker, supranote 11, at 708.
297. See Rosenbury, supra note 79, at 891 (advancing a theory of childrearing that takes place
between home and school to create "pluralism within the family as well as without").
298. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Rights and Realities, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 39, 43

(2008),

http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/09/0l/rosenbury.pdf;

Barbara

Bennett

Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. &

MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
299. See O'Donoghue & Perkins, supra note 266; see also supra note 266 and accompanying
text.
300. See O'Donoghue & Perkins, supra note 266.
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Such disruption and diffusion of parenthood might be steps along
the way to more far-reaching reform that some scholars have
contemplated, dismantling the status of parent.30 1 Because the state is
inextricably involved in deciding who is a parent and what parenthood
entails, 30 2 dismantling the legal status would necessarily transform the
practice and understanding of parenting, perhaps dismantling parental
status altogether.
What would that mean, given the dependency of
30 3
children?
To contemplate this question-to see whether we might even
imagine such "dismantling"--we might first try to tease out the aspects
of such dependency on parents that our laws produce and that seem to
make children more dependent than others.30 4 Perhaps after stripping
away the law-based ways that children depend on parents, we would be
left with the particular dependency of gestation.30 5 Even here, however,
law plays a role, as we can see from situations in which a "gestational
surrogate" is deemed not to be a parent; 30 6 hence, in these situations,
whatever the dependency that gestation entails, it is not dependency on a
parent.
Next, in pursuing this thought experiment, we could consider how
children and their care could be entrusted, instead of to those whom the
law recognizes as parents, to interested members of the community or a
collective of friends,30 7 as suggested by the Indian Child Welfare Act's
301. See, e.g., Murray, supranote 79, at 453-54; Rosenbury, supra note 298, at 44.
302. See DWYER, supra note 7, at 26, 135.
303. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 851 n.46 (1985) ("In civilized society, young children remain dependent. That this
dependency is on the child's parents is surely based on laws.").
304. See id. (noting that mothers and fathers too are dependent upon the community and
theorizing that we could shorten the period of children's dependency "if, for example, property laws
were not enforceable against children," who would be allowed to take whatever they needed).
305. Cf, e.g., Appleton, supra note 24, at 282-84.
306. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998); In re Roberto
D.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007).
307. Consider Katherine Franke's thoughts about what it would mean to unseat "marriage [as]
the measure of all things." Katherine M. Franke, Longingfor Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2685,
2689 (2008). She considers the possibility of substituting friendship for marriage:
Breaking loose from the architecture of marriage and the hetero-normative domestic that
it entails renders it more possible to imagine and then construct other forms of
attachment that are not always already a betrayal or disappointment of marriage's
demands and the expectations they engender. Interrupting marriage's preemptory
normalization of the social field by substituting friendship in its place opens up a range
of possible conceptions of the meaning of reproductive sex-between friends, between
strangers, in fact, all reproductive sex. Escaping the social field of marriage enables new
forms of commitment, responsibility, love, care, and relatedness other than those of
idealized "mother" and "father."
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deference to caregiving within a tribe 30 8 or by the slogan "It takes a
village."30 9 Or, parental status might be dismantled by making it allencompassing and thus erasing any distinction between parents and
others, as suggested by a recent advertisement for a new T-Mobile
310
calling plan, which proclaims that "Now Family Includes Everyone."
Still, even with far more adults participating in a child's rearing,
someone no doubt would need to orchestrate the participants, and the
attributes that we currently associate with parental status might accrete
to that individual. 31 1 Alternatively, in envisioning what this dismantling
could mean, we might imagine the not unpleasant experiences of the
children as they grow up in a school-like setting-both parentless and
knowing they will remain childless-in
Kazuo Ishiguro's haunting
3 12
Go.
Me
Let
Never
novel,
dystopian
Professor Melissa Murray raises the possibility of dismantling
parental status in her examination of the legal consequences that might
follow from parents' reliance on others for caregiving, but she pushes
back because of practical difficulties, such as the predictable impact on
tax and immigration law and, of course, family law. 313 I would hesitate
for a different reason-because normatively I continue to believe that a
system that prefers parental choices about how to respond to a child's
dependency serves children better than the alternatives. 314 Put quite
differently, although the children's environment depicted in the early
scenes of Never Let Me Go3 15 (before the reader understands the context)
is pleasant enough, something important seems missing from their lives,
and I suspect that the absence of parents inspires this sense of loss. 3 16 My
position favoring the retention of parental status, however, concedes that
this status is legally constructed; my position also leaves me

Id. at 2704-05.
308. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23 (2000); see Murray, supra note 79, at 419-22.
309. See, e.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS
CHILDREN TEACH US (1996).

310. N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, at A17 (full-page advertisement "introducing the T-Mobile
unlimited family plan").
311. Clare Huntington affirmatively advocates this role for "parents as hubs" even within a
larger network of individuals whom the law might recognize for their contributions to caregiving.
Huntington, supranote 295.
312.

KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME Go (2005).

313. See Murray, supra note 79, at 453-54.
314. See also Buss, supra note 173, at 647; Buss, supra note 283, at 1104; Elizabeth S. Scott,
ParentalAutonomy and Children's Welfare, I1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1077-79 (2003).

315. See ISHIGURO, supra note 312, at 6-12.
316. See also Alstott, supra note 164 (emphasizing family's role in fostering emotional and
moral development, cultural identity, and values).
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considerable room to ask whom the law should recognize as a parent and
317
to conceptualize this status in some modified size, shape, or form.
Thus, although I see several features of the current construction of
parental status that merit rethinking, I support the recognition of three
parents in Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob 18 and A.A. v. B.B.
over the
alternatives of recognizing just two or jettisoning parentage altogether.
This bottom line, however, turns on my own value judgment about what
best serves the interests of the children in these cases, a reference point
repeatedly invoked as a guiding principle in family law.320
In concluding, the following Part considers the role of this best
interests principle in shaping the recent discourse on multi-parentage as
well as the role of this discourse in illuminating some particular
difficulties in the best interests principle itself. In doing so, this Part
explains my support for the outcomes in the three-parent cases.
V.

CONCLUSION: MULTI-PARENTAGE AND THE PROFESSED
CENTRALITY OF CHILDREN'S INTERESTS

Given the "best interests" mantra that every family law student
learns,3 2' it should come as no surprise that all the participants in the
discourse about parental numbers invoke children's interests. As Baker
concedes, however, children's interests are "incredibly difficult to
ascertain... in the abstract. 3 22 The Revolution in Parenthoodattempts
to move beyond the abstract to make the case for "natural parents,"

317. Professor James Dwyer, for example, has undertaken a lengthy exercise along these lines.
See DWYER, supra note 7, at 253-90.
318. 2007 PA Super. 118,
24-25, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
319. [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 533-34 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub nom. Alliance for
Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
320. But see DWYER, supra note 7, at 24, 67 (asserting that law does not prioritize children's
interests).
321.

See, e.g.,

PRINCIPLES OF

THE LAW

OF

FAMILY

DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.02(l) cmt. b (2002); see also id. § 202(1) rptr. notes cmt. b. Sometimes,
the rationale for a legal rule affecting children will include a quite candid concession that values
other than the child's immediate interests drive the result. The Supreme Court's pronouncement that
the Constitution does not permit race-based custody decisions, regardless of the projected relevance
to the child, makes this point. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (rejecting as a
constitutionally permissible reason to change custody to child's father the predicted discriminatory
peer pressure on a Caucasian child whose custodial mother married an African-American man); see
also supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
322. Baker, supra note 11, at 682; see also JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW,
TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION INAN UNEASY AGE 239-43 (1997); Cahn, supra note 221, at 56, 9-14 (noting how the best interests test disguises assumptions and judgments about parental
rights).
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specifically married biological parents who rear their children,32 3 by
quoting personal narratives and citing pro-marriage social science
evidence.324 Particularly poignant are the voices of children of assisted
reproduction seeking knowledge about and contact with genetic
parents.32 5 Yet, while this report invokes such personal statements to
solidify "the rule of tWo,, ' 32 6 competing narratives prompt supporters of
multi-parentage to look beyond two 327 so that children can have it allrecognized and protected relationships with the several adults who have
played important roles in their lives, from those with whom they have
developed affective ties to those whose genetic material they have
inherited. Indeed, the courts in both Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob32 8 and A.A. v.
B.B. 3 29 base their recognition of three parents on the interests of the
children in question.
Certainly, this would not be the first context in which authorities
have taken different positions on what legal arrangement best serves
children. Children's interests have been cited as a rationale for
protecting parental autonomy; 330 they have also been cited as a
foundation for children's rights to challenge parental authority.331 For
years, children's interests were cited to support sole custody and unified
decisionmaking after divorce (the view of Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit); 332 more recently, children's interests have been cited to support a

323. See THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supranote 7, at 15-19.
324. I call this evidence "pro-marriage" because, as in many current debates in the "culture
wars," one can find studies claiming to provide support for both sides. See, e.g., Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161-67 (2007) (noting disagreements within medical community about
health risks posed by ban on "partial birth abortion"); Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Family &
Children's Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 824-26 (11th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging conflicting data in
unsuccessful constitutional challenge to Florida's ban on adoption by noncelibate gays and
lesbians); cf In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2008) (relying on expert
testimony to invalidate Florida's ban on adoptions by gays and lesbians). Some have found
deliberate political manipulation in the production of scientific evidence. See Michael Specter,
PoliticalScience: The Bush Administration's War on the Laboratory,NEW YORKER, Mar. 13, 2006,
at 58, 59.
325. See THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7, at 17-19.
326. Id. at 32-33.
327. Jacobs, supra note 7, 336-38; see also Baker, supranote 11,at 687-89.
24-25, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
328. 2007 PA Super. 118,
Alliance for
329. [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 533 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub noma.
Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
330. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (2005); Buss, supra
note 173.
331. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part); see also Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 56-57
(1999).
332.

GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supranote 85, at 38.
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preference for joint custody. 333
And now some push-back from that
334
position has started to emerge.
Perhaps a more candid analysis would present the best interests
standard as a prominent example of aspirational family law, 335 which at
a very general level captures how this legal system ought to work while
ignoring its shortcomings. A more cynical view might describe
references to the standard as a meaningless ritual or as a cover for value
336
judgments or political agendas that usually remain undisclosed.
Certainly, however, family law's invariable practice of imposing on
unwilling adults only financial obligations for children-never visitation
or decisionmaking responsibilities-belies any full-throated claim that
family law prioritizes children's interests over adults'. 337 Other than
child support, children get only what parents are willing to provide.
There is no indication that multi-parentage is likely to challenge this
unspoken baseline of adults' autonomy when assessing children's best
interests.
Although this is not the place to recite a full critique or defense of
the best interests standard, a few observations pertinent to multiparentage are worth noting. First, the call for family law to respect
children's needs and to reflect their experiences often fails to consider
fully how the law itself and related norms shape those needs and
experiences, as others have noted.3 38 For example, opponents of multiparentage assert that children want and need to be reared by married
biological parents, and legal limits to effectuate this objective thus

333.

HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE

UNITED STATES 136-143 (1988); Maldonado, supra note 179, at 983-84.
334. Brinig, Penalty Defaults, supra note 205, at 781-86.
335. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 85, at 53-54 (advocating as a more accurate
description of the goal the "least detrimental available alternative").
336. One can find countless criticisms along this line. Bartlett, supra note 144, at 303; Robert
H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face ofIndeterminacy, 39 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 260-61; see also, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic
Judgments: Against the Best Interests ofthe Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-21 (1987).
337. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. True, one can envision substantial
practical difficulties (even for the child's wellbeing) that would follow an order of, say, compelled
visitation in a case in which the adult seeks to disclaim all relationship with the child. Nonetheless,
the issue reveals how limited and contingent our understanding of children's interests remains. But
cf Maldonado, supra note 179, at 989 (proposing "Refusal of Parental Responsibilities" hearing for
a parent to avoid exercising joint legal custody).
338. See Rosenbury, supra note 298; see also, e.g., DOLGIN, supra note 322, at 33-39;
Maldonado, supra note 179, at 930-37. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the
Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901 (2000) (exploring how law can affect marital
norms).
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should follow. 339 Under an alternative reading, however, children feel
marginalized, different, lonely, and frustrated when their family lives do
not conform to a socially and legally constructed norm-so that
legitimizing variations from the norm becomes a child-centered
remedy.34 ° In fact, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invoked
precisely such child-focused reasoning in ruling that marriage must be
open to same-sex couples--expressly attempting to alter through law
reform the experiences of children growing up in such families.34 1
The dynamic relationship between family law and lived experience
runs deep. For example, family law accords very different treatment to,
say, a parent, a grandmother (whom every state recognizes to some
degree through visitation statutes), and a nanny (whom family law treats
as invisible).342 This different legal treatment necessarily affects the
expectations and experiences of the parent, the grandmother, and the
nanny343 and thus, in turn, the emotions and needs of the children in their
care. 344 The governing rules not only influence conduct, as economists
and family law's "channeling theorists" 345 have told us; they also affect
feelings and self-perceptions-particularly for children, whose conduct
choices are more limited than those of adult actors.
The reports from the Yearning for Zion compound- in Texas, stating
that children regard several women as their mothers and cannot identify
the two adults whom we outsiders would call their "parents," show how
the governing rules and norms affect the way one lives a life and sees the
world.346 Thus, the ability of family law to look beyond bi-parentage
would reshape "reality" as it is experienced. The expressive value of

339. See generally THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD, supra note 7 (advocating the
preservation of the "two-person mother-father model" of parenthood).
340. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Pluralism:A Principlefor Children'sRights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 317, 327 (2007).
341. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003); id. at 972
(Greaney, J., concurring); see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401, 433, 452 (Cal. 2008) (using
similar reasoning); see also Appleton, supra note 270, at 130 (noting how same-sex marriage
legitimates gender performances departing from the norm).
342. See generally Murray, supra note 79 (exploring the differing legal treatment for parents,
grandparents, and nonparental caregivers); Roberts, supra note 129 (exploring the devaluation of
menial household tasks).
343. Cf Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 (1977)
(examining the legally constructed and limited nature of the foster family).
344. Cf ROTHMAN, supra note 129, at 135-44 (examining the experiences of those rearing
children as parents and those rearing children as caregivers and thus exploring what it means to rear
children).
345. See supranote 249 and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., O'Donoghue & Perkins, supranote 266; see also Emens, supra note 2, at 317.
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parental status plays an important role in this experience.34 7 Officially
recognized multi-parentage families create a new norm and a new
baseline-they would no longer seem "unfamiliar and disorienting,"
terms I used at the outset. 348 The pluralism that officially recognized
multi-parentage families reflect might help family law achieve equality,
not by treating everyone alike, but by signaling that the state values and
respects diversity and that not all families must conform to an ideal
rooted in very different assumptions.349
Second, multi-parentage reveals some valuable insights connecting
children's interests and family law's channeling function. Professor Carl
Schneider's classic examination of family law's channeling function
focused on marriage and parenthood, typically understood as adult
activities.350 Consistent with this focus, examinations of family law's
channeling function usually consider efforts to steer sexual desires and
activities toward marriage, which provides a structure for managing the
dependency that results from heterosexual intercourse's procreative
consequences, whether intended or not.351
Despite the literature's focus on adults and their choices, however,
channeling affects and is necessarily designed to affect children, even
very young children. For example, abstinence-only sex education
expressly aims to channel children.352 In addition, children no doubt
absorb the performances by other members of the community, both
adults and more mature children, in response to channeling.
That young
353
girls want to grow up to be brides is far from an accident!
Family law's aspirations and express efforts to influence
preferences and behaviors necessarily play a role in law reform. For
example, the implications-no doubt, intended--of the rejection of
gender stereotypes, articulated by Congress in the Family and Medical
Leave Act354 and by the Supreme Court in interpreting this statute,355
347. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
349. See Kessler, supra note 10, at 50-52; cf Lau, supra note 340, at 335 (advocating pluralism
as "the antidote to assimilation demands" and as an element in "children's rights jurisprudence").
350. Schneider, supranote 249, at 500.
351. Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (N.Y. 2006); see also McClain, supra note 249,
at 2163-68.
352. Currently, federal funds are available to support sex education programs, but only if the
programs promote exclusively abstinence from all sexual activity prior to marriage. 42 U.S.C. § 710

(2000).
353. Cf Ginia Bellafante, Even in Gay Circles, the Women Want the Ring, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2005 (reporting greater popularity of same-sex marriage for lesbian couples, compared to gay male
couples).
354. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000). See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
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include not only altered behaviors of employers and employees in the
workplace and even at home3 56 but also altered perspectives of children
growing up in the reformed culture. More than their immediate
experiences are affected, but also their values, goals, and visions for
their own futures. 357 To the extent one embraces the repudiation of
gender stereotypes, these are positive moves and intended consequences.
Thus, in evaluating the emergence of multi-parentage, one should
look beyond children's immediate experiences in specific cases and keep
in mind family law's channeling function. When Kessler claims legally
recognized multi-parentage can liberate family law from confining
hierarchies based on gender, sexuality, and biology and I venture that we
might discern in the cases a reinforcement of these values, 358 we should
both consider how children might view these developments. Further, the
opponents of multi-parentage no doubt have their sights set on the
interplay between family law's treatment of parentage and family law's
channeling function.
Third, by acknowledging family law's aspirations and channeling
function in the context of the field's familiar encomium to the best
interests of the child, the discourse on multi-parentage can help highlight
an important "disconnect"-an ambiguity in "best interests" that results
in frequent conversations in which the participants talk past one another.
Family law's aspirations and channeling function look to the future and
thus to children's wellbeing in general, including future generations of
children. Yet, particular applications of best interests claim to be highly
individualized and exquisitely fact-sensitive. 359 Occasionally-for
example, in the controversy about transracial adoption-one can find
acknowledgment of these two different understandings of "best
360
interests."

355. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003). See supra notes 275-76
and accompanying text.
356. See Schneider, supra note 249, at 523.
357. Acknowledging the importance of role models is commonplace. See, e.g., Chambers v.
Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (unsuccessful challenge to dismissal from
employment at girls club of single, pregnant employee deemed to be a poor role model); John
McCormick & Mike Doming, Obama, Clinton Duel to a Duet: Ex-Foes Unite to Sing Each Other's
Praises,CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2008, at C1 (quoting then-Senator Obama: "Because of the campaign
that Hillary Clinton waged, my daughters and all of your daughters will forever know there is no
barrier to who they are and what they can be in the United States of America.").
358. See supraPart IV.A.
359. See, e.g., supra note 209 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 795 (D.C. App. 1982) (Mack, J., concurring)
(Commenting on the role of race, the judge notes: "In a custody or adoption proceeding, we are not
concerned with the best interest of children generally; we are concerned, rather, with the best
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In the individual cases, Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob36 1 and A.A. v.B.B.
I have no doubt that the courts reached the correct results in recognizing
three parents. The label "parent" mattered, because the law makes such
titles important. The courts honored and respected the particular
families-in which no one voiced opposition to parental status for any of
the three adults in each case-and also legitimated the lived experiences
of the children in question. Indeed, despite the criticisms of the
opponents of multi-parentage,363 they should find much to like in these
particular outcomes because in each case the genetic father was formally
brought into364the family fold, resulting in legal protection for this
relationship.
When moving to a more general level, however, normative analysis
becomes more difficult and contentious. A one-size-fits-all rule (what
Baker dubs "[b]inariness for binariness' sake" 365 ) strikes me as too blunt
to constitute a child-centered rule about how many legal parents a
particular child may have. Thus, I would reject a doctrine that
determines parents by the numbers in the sense of making a numerical
limit dispositive in all cases.
I favor a more pluralistic and nuanced approach that respects
diversity among families and is sufficiently capacious to honor a given
child's experience. The ability of family law to recognize more than two
legal parents is consistent with such goals, even though giving
lawmakers more authority and judges more discretion to decide when to
do so entails significant risks-as frequently detailed in critiques of the
indeterminacy of the best interests standard itself.3 66 Thus, family law
should remain open to the possibility that a child might have parents by
the numbers, in the sense of numerous parents. Put differently, allowing
interest of THE child."). Likewise, in strict applications of the "nexus test," courts purport to
determine whether particular conduct by a gay or lesbian parent has had an adverse effect on a
child, rather than relying on generalizations about whether gay and lesbian parents serve children's
best interests. E.g., McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 117 (Idaho 2004); see also Michael S. Wald,
Adults' Sexual Orientation and State Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, 40 FAM.

L.Q. 381, 434 (2006) (using a child-focused analysis to conclude that consideration of an adult's
sexual orientation is likely to be harmful to children and generally should be irrelevant in placement
decisions).
361. 2007 PA Super. 118, j 24-25, 923 A.2d 473, 482.
362. [2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 533-34 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub nom. Alliance for
Marriage & Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
363. Marquardt, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, supra note 17, at A13.
364. See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text. It is not clear whether the supporters of
bi-parentage would regard including a gay genetic father in the family fold as a benefit to a child
otherwise being reared by a single mother or a lesbian couple.
365. Baker, supra note 11, at 685.
366. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
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recognition of more than two parents offers benefits for some individual
children and opens up family law's channeling efforts by increasing and
diversifying the valid paths for others to follow.
Nonetheless, if I were to shift my focus entirely from the individual
children in Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob367 and A.A. v. B.B.3 68 to a more
aspirational level of family law, I would probably give other issues
priority on a child-centered agenda, including making child support a
public responsibility 369 and revisiting the preference for joint
decisionmaking after dissolution.37 ° Indeed, completing the unfinished
business of recent reforms 37 'and thereby developing as a larger frame
a more normatively coherent family law-might well make the
particular question of parental numbers a much less difficult and
contested topic.

367.
368.
Marriage
369.
370.
371.

2007 PA Super. 118,
24-25, 923 A.2d 473, 482.
[2007] 278 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 533-34 (Can.), leave to appeal denied sub noma.Alliance for
& Family v. A.A., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 124.
See supranotes 162-65 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 189-206 and accompanying text.
See supraPart ll.
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